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A tsunami of disinformation is washing over the world, with social media helping it 
to spread quickly and widely. The purveyors of disinformation use it to press their 
agenda by adding untruths where previously there were none, fabricating stories, 
reporting them out of context, or doctoring images to promote their message. In the 
past, disinformation has been a prelude to and run concurrently with other attacks, 
including cyber and conventional warfare, and when officials reacted to 
disinformation, they successfully slowed its flow but did not entirely stop it, and may 
not have “won” cyber or conventional battles. Researchers say even multiple 
corrections don’t fully stop disinformation, and sowing skepticism by forewarning of 
a probable disinformation campaign is the most successful way of staunching the 
flow. Tools have been developed to help detect disinformation rapidly but officials 
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'Should be fine but I love you’ 
 
Just after midnight on September 29, 2017, I received this message from my 
son, 1,620 miles and two time zones away at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) 
in Colorado:  
 
For the next three-and-a-bit hours, I sat in my living room, working my laptop 
with one hand and my phone with the other, trying to make sense for myself and my 
son of what was happening at USAFA.  
Ten minutes after that text from my son, the Air Force Academy tweeted 






Within minutes, social media erupted. Parents had already been sending 
questions to @AF_Academy, asking if there really was a shooter – or shooters – after 
being alerted to the lockdown by their cadets, as students at the Academy are called. 
The cadets were following what was going on through online chat rooms and other 
social media, including Reddit and Twitter feeds associated with their squadrons.  
It was in cyber space that the incident escalated. The “shooters” grew from 
one to three to eight within the space of a few tweets. They moved from the bowling 
alley to the Prep School and into the secure cadet area at lightning speed. Cadets 
tweeted that they'd heard shots fired, that people were jumping from dorm windows. 
A message on Reddit said the shooters were firing at windows, and, when questioned 
about the source for that piece of information, one cadet cited his "roommate looking 
out the fucking window." People who were off-base tweeted that one of the shooters 





they were dressed as security forces and were trying to trick cadets into coming out of 
their rooms. 
 
At the height of the incident, there was a frenzy of tweets and chatter on social 
media, making it impossible for the cadets to know what was going on, and very 
difficult for people like me, nearly 2,000 miles away, to make sense of what was 
happening and relay reliable information to those in the midst of the crisis.  Air Force 
Academy officials remained silent, except for one additional tweet about an hour into 
the crisis.  
 
Their next tweet came around two hours later and said no shooters had been 
found. It had all been a false alarm, reportedly triggered by a cadet candidate (a 





the hallways for live gunfire. None of the alarmist tweets about a shooter committing 
suicide, bad guys dressed as security forces, pot-shots aimed at the windows of 
cadets’ rooms were true.  
Experiencing this in real-time gave me an opportunity to watch as a crisis 
unfolded, observe the communications strategy of officials at USAFA and determine 
if it was effective at dispelling the disinformation that was doing the rounds and 
causing the crisis. Media reports said USAFA had assembled its crisis action team, a 
group of leaders who respond to emergencies.1 Immediately after the incident had 
been resolved, Academy officials announced they were investigating what caused it. 
USAFA did not did not respond to my phone calls and follow-up emails about the 
investigation, including whether it was still ongoing.  
 The lack of a response from USAFA officials left my son and me and 
thousands of others2 to try to make sense of what was going on, and allowed 
disinformation to spread unchecked. One report about the incident said the furor on 
social media over the false alarm “turned a minor incident into the ‘War of the 
Worlds.’”3  When I finally went to bed at 4 a.m. on September 30th, I wondered if the 
impact of the alarmist messages that I saw on Twitter during the three-hour incident 
at USAFA would have been different if Academy officials had been monitoring 
social media and had intervened with rebuttals to say the information we were 
                                                 
1 Roeder, T. No evidence of shots fired at Air Force Academy; social media fuels 'hysteria.' Colorado 
Springs Gazette. Oct. 1, 2017. http://gazette.com/no-evidence-of-shots-fired-at-air-force-academy-
social-media-fuels-hysteria/article/1612291  
2 There are 4,000 cadets and several thousand more service members living on-base at the U.S. Air 
Force Academy in Colorado Springs.  






receiving was supposition and rumor. When I had to find a topic for my thesis, I 
chose to focus on how disinformation spreads, and whether prompt action by 
authorities can affect our reception of the falsehoods doing the rounds. In the course 
of writing this thesis, I found that few organizations have a strategy to counteract 
disinformation on the same media – more often than not, social -- that is being used to  
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When people find themselves in the midst of a crisis, their instinct is to try to 
make sense of what’s happening. This is inherently difficult at the best of times, but 
more so when there is a large amount of disinformation about the crisis in circulation, 
and a lack of information to counter it from trusted authorities. During crises when 
danger is imminent, if official information is inconsistent, individuals often turn to 
unofficial channels to inform themselves and try to make sense of the situation.4 
Today, those unofficial media are most often social media, where unverified 
information and rumors abound.5   
1.1 Methodology 
 
This thesis looks at the spread of disinformation during a crisis, and what 
impact the response to that disinformation by trusted authorities has on those involved 
in the crisis, including the authorities themselves and the institution they represent. It 
is a theoretical discussion paper based on published research and comments in the 
public domain. Case studies are used to show successful reactions to disinformation, 
and how they do not always mean officials are successful in “winning” in other 
arenas, such as cyber or conventional warfare. Studies by cognitive psychologist and 
University of Bristol professor Stephan Lewandowsky,6 University of Washington 
                                                 
4 Jones, N et al. Rumors during a campus lockdown. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences Oct 2017. 114 (44) 11663-11668. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/44/11663 
5 Ibid. 





assistant professor Kate Starbird,7 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews of the 
RAND Corporation,8 and University of California, Irvine doctoral student Nickolas 
Jones are cited extensively in this report, alongside scores of other reports looking at 
the characteristics of disinformation, whether it can be stopped, how technology and 
social media have enabled purveyors of disinformation, who the main purveyors are, 
and more. Several studies offer empirical advice on how to stop disinformation, or try 
to stop it. 
The incidents I focused on are: 
• the disinformation campaign, riots and subsequent cyber-attacks in 
Estonia in April and May 2007, triggered by the removal of a statue of 
a Red Army soldier from the center of the capital, Tallinn (Ch. 6.1);   
• the brief conflict in the autonomous region of South Ossetia in 
Georgia, which Russia invaded and seized, and the longer 
disinformation conflict that preceded it, ran concurrently with it and 
continues to this day (Ch. 6.2); 
• New Year’s Eve celebrations in Dortmund, Germany in 2016, which 
were hyperbolized and falsified by far-right media in the U.K. and 
Austria (Ch. 6.3). 
I’ve also looked at the mass shooting in June 2016 at the Olympia shopping 
center in Munich, during which an anonymous Twitter user used “terror-indicating 
                                                 
7 http://faculty.washington.edu/kstarbi/ 
8 Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews, The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: 






news” to try to associate a violent act with Muslim extremists; the aftermath of the 
shooting at Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, when 
groups opposed to the activism of the students and, separately, the sheriff’s 
department, used visual disinformation to attack them; disinformation during the U.S. 
elections in 2016; and historical cases of disinformation from ancient Rome and the 
Cold War.   
I’ve focused primarily on Twitter as the means for conveying information and 
disinformation during a crisis. Many people turn to Twitter for information during a 
crisis,9 10 11 12 especially in the absence of updates from official sources.13 During the 
2007 disinformation campaign, riots and cyber attacks in Estonia, and the 2008 
conflict in Georgia, which was fought on the ground and in the disinformation realm, 
Twitter was in its infancy. The microblogging application has since come of age and 
proven to be a conduit for information and disinformation in emergency and disaster 
situations.14 Responses to disinformation during the Estonia and Georgia crises were 
made on the same media as the falsehoods were being spread. 
                                                 
9 Blair Thompson, Joseph P. Mazer, Holly J. Payne, Angela M. Jerome, E. Gail Kirby & William 
Pfohl (2016) Social Media and Active Shooter Events: A School Crisis Communication 
Challenge, Qualitative Research Reports in Communication, 18:1, 8-17. 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17459435.2016.1247111  
10  Vieweg, Sarah. Microblogged Contributions to the Emergency Arena: Discovery, Interpretation and 
Implications. Computer Supported Collaborative Work. Feb. 2010. 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.495.520&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
11 Westerman, D. et al. Social Media as Information Source: Recency of Updates and Credibility of 
Information. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 19 (2014) 171–183. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12041  
12 Zubiaga, A. et al. Analysing how people orient to and spread rumours in social media by looking at 
conversational threads. PLoS ONE. 11. 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0150989 
13 Jones, N et al. Rumors during a campus lockdown. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences Oct 2017. 114 (44) 11663-11668. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/44/11663  
14 Vosoughi, S. Automatic Detection and Verification of Rumors on Twitter. Ph.D. dissertation.MIT.  





The active shooter incident at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) on Sept. 
29-30 was the impetus behind this thesis. That crisis was characterized by the fact 
that it lasted several hours, giving ample time for disinformation to start to flow, gain 
momentum and eventually die; that the incident started out as misinformation, or 
unintentionally erroneous information, and became a crisis when disinformation was 
shared via social media; and that the authorities at USAFA did not react to the 
disinformation. Another unique element of the USAFA incident is that I was closely 
involved in it—my son is a cadet at the academy—and was watching in real-time and 
trying to filter disinformation from truth as it spread on Twitter.  
By way of warning, I have not deleted expletives from quotes, tweets or book 
titles.  
Lastly, although I was granted IRB approval, I had to withdraw my request to 
include human subjects (interviewees) and conduct a poll in my research for reasons 
outside of my control.  
1.2 Terminology 
 
Although many of the terms used in this thesis are part of the day-to-day 
lexicon, I will define several of them here. 
• Active measures 
A euphemistic term from Soviet times, broadly synonymous with 
disinformation today, “active measures” means the use of manipulation and media 





measures to “weaken the enemies of the USSR and create a favorable environment 
for advancing Moscow’s views and international objectives worldwide.”15 “Soviet 
active measures involved a wide range of techniques for influencing events in foreign 
countries including overt and covert propaganda… the use of front organizations, 
agents of influence, and forgeries; assistance to insurgencies and terrorist movements, 
and acts of sabotage and murder. The central objective was to create a psychological 
climate conducive to the advancement of Soviet interests, and to discredit and 
demoralize the West.” 16 
• Agenda 
For the purposes of this thesis, agenda is defined as an underlying, often 
ideological plan or program. Disinformation is often use to further a government’s or 
group’s agenda, such as deepening political divides in a country or exacerbating 
ethnic tensions.  
• Botnet 
A botnet is a collection of internet-connected devices, which may include 
PCs, servers, mobile devices and internet of things devices that are infected and 
controlled by malware. Users are often unaware of a botnet infecting their system.17 
• Confirmation bias  
                                                 
15 Boghart, T. Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS Disinformation 
Campaign. Studies in Intelligence Vol. 53, No. 4 (December 2009) 








The tendency to look for information that confirms already held beliefs and 
ignore information that contradicts them, without concern for their truth or 
falsehood.18 The tendency to interpret new evidence as confirmation of one's existing 
beliefs or theories. When people would like a certain idea/concept to be true, they end 
up believing it to be true.19  
• Crisis  
A crisis is an unexpected occurrence that may have negative consequences, 
which can lead to uncertainty, instability, and, in many cases, a need for immediate 
action or response.20  In the corporate world, a crisis is defined as: "Any situation that 
is threatening or could threaten to harm people or property, seriously interrupt 
business, damage reputation and/or negatively impact stock value."21 Taking 
elements from both definitions, a crisis is defined for the purposes of this report as a 
situation that causes or threatens to cause harm to people, property or a system – 
government, academia, financial, military base operations; interrupts normal activity, 
and holds the potential to damage a person's or institution's reputation.  
• Disinformation  
                                                 
18 http://www.animal-ethics.org/motivated-reasoning-confirmation-bias/ 
19 Heshmat, S. What is confirmation bias? Psychology Today.  April 23, 2015. Accessed online at 
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias 
20 Stein, A. We Thought It Could Never Happen Here, Journal of  Promotion Management, 12:3-4.Pp. 
99-128, https://doi.org/10.1300/J057v12n03_07 






The Oxford Dictionaries website defines disinformation as “false information 
supplied by a government to the media with the intention of influencing the policies 
or opinions of those who receive it.” In “Disinformation: Former Spy Chief Reveals 
Secret Strategies for Undermining Freedom, Attacking Religion, and Promoting 
Terrorism,” published in 2013, former Romanian spy chief Ion Mihail Pacepa says 
disinformation is the spreading of an idea in a foreign nation, while making it appear 
as if the idea originated in that nation.” 22 Kumar and Geethakumari say 
disinformation is “often the product of a carefully planned and technically 
sophisticated deceit process; may not come directly from the source that intends to 
deceive; and can include written or verbal communication, doctored photographs, 
fake videos etc.23 
Many scholars believe disinformation to be the Anglicization of the Russian 
word dezinformatsiya. The term is said to have been coined by Soviet leader Joseph 
Stalin and to have come into use in the 1950s. Stalin reportedly wanted a word that 
sounded European (French) so that the original concept of disinformation would not 
be associated with the Soviet Union but with the West. Disinformation is, of course, 
used in the West as well as in the former Communist bloc. In the U.S. when it is used, 
its intent is most often to sway public opinion against a person or group, such as a 
political opponent of whomever has ordered the disinformation campaign. 
• Gatekeepers 
                                                 
22 http://russialist.org/russian-born-disinformation-breeds-terror-slanders-us-new-book/ 
23 Kumar, KPK &  & Geethakumari, Detecting misinformation in online social networks using 






In the media world, gatekeepers are those who filter information before it is 
published, broadcast, posted on websites or social media or any other medium. 
Gatekeeping in communications/journalism used to be the remit of trusted journalists, 
professional editors and news agencies. Many citizen journalist sites have an editorial 
staff that is tasked with, among other things, gatekeeping. But the advent and 
popularization of social media have increased the number of stories that do not pass 
through gatekeepers.  
• Microblogging 
A form of lightweight chat that allows users to send short messages to people 
subscribed to their streams.24   
• Misinformation 25 
Misinformation is information that is unintentionally false. Misinformation 
often arises out of misinterpretation of scientific results, such as a report that a 
flavonoid in hops, which is used to make beer, made young mice smarter.26 27 The 
intelligent beer-drinking mice story is also an example of how poor sourcing can 
contribute to the spread of misinformation: the writer of the story cites as his source 
                                                 
24 Starbird et al. Chatter on the red: what hazards threat reveals about the social life of microblogged 
information. Proceedings of the 2010 ACM conference on Computer supported cooperative work. 241-
250.  
25 In some of the studies included in my research, the authors use misinformation where I have used 
disinformation.  
26 Yakowicz, W. Have a beer, it’s good for your brain. Inc.com. Oct. 3, 2014. 
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/beer-improves-brain-function.html 





an article in The Daily Mail rather than the original source of the study, which he 
identifies as researchers at Oregon State University.28  
Misinformation often circulates in evolving crisis situations. Information that 
is considered “correct” at any given stage during a crisis can later turn out to be 
untrue. Examples of this sort of misinformation are changing death tolls, the cause of 
an explosion, or the whereabouts of a suspect.  Providing timely news coverage of 
unfolding events is by its very nature piecemeal and requires occasional corrections 
of earlier statements, write Lewandowsky et al.29  
• Motivated reasoning  
Motivated reasoning is a mechanism by which people access, construct and 
evaluate arguments and data in a biased way in order to arrive at a preferred 
conclusion that fits their beliefs, preferences and wishes.30 31 32 
• Retweet 
A retweet is a message from another source that is forwarded by a Twitter 
user and becomes visible to followers. 
                                                 
28 Zamzow, DR et al. Xanthohumol improved cognitive flexibility in young mice. Behavioural Brain 
Research. Volume 275, 15 December 2014, Pages 1-10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2014.08.045  
29 Lewandowsky, S. et al. Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and Successful 
Debiasing. Psychological Science in the Public Interest 13(3) 106–131. 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1529100612451018 
30 Weir, K. Why we believe alternative facts. American Psychological Association. May 2017, Vol 48, 
No. 5. http://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/05/alternative-facts.aspx  
31 Stone, Daniel F. and Wood, Daniel H., Cognitive Dissonance, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Confirmation Bias: Applications in Industrial Organization (December 2, 
2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834072   





• Social media 
Social media are computer-mediated technologies that facilitate the creation 
and sharing of information, ideas, career interests and other forms of expression via 
virtual communities and networks.33  Social media allow individuals and communities 
to share, create, discuss and modify user-generated content. 34 
• Troll 
An internet troll is a person who intentionally antagonizes others online by 
posting inflammatory, irrelevant, or offensive comments or other disruptive content.35 
• Trusted authorities 
Trust is the firm belief in the reliability, truth or ability of someone or 
something.36  An authority is a person or organization having political or 
administrative power and control, or a person with extensive or specialized 
knowledge about a subject; an expert.37 Authority often appears in the plural form.38 
Trusted authorities are, therefore, a person or organization in a leadership position, 
with extensive knowledge about a subject, and whom we believe to be reliable and 
truthful. 
                                                 
33 Wikipedia.  
34 Kietzmann, JH et al. Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional building blocks of 




36 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/trust  







A form or subset of social media that is sometimes referred to as 
microblogging, Twitter allows users to retrieve, produce and spread information using 
a maximum of 280 characters (previously limited to 140). It has been referred to as a 
real-time information network and a real-time news source created by everyday 
users.39 
• User-generated content 
User-generated content (UGC) has been called the lifeblood of social media. It 
includes video, blogs, discussion forum posts, digital images, audio files, and other 
media created by consumers or end-users of an online system or service that is 
publicly available to others. The quality of UGC is threatened by the creation and 
diffusion of misleading information, including disinformation, manipulation, 
misinformation and rumors.40  
1.3 Literature review 
 
Disinformation has been implicated in the outcomes of the Brexit vote in the 
U.K. in June 2016 and Donald Trump’s surprise victory in the U.S. presidential 
election in November of the same year. Since then, it has been a hot topic for 
discussion, debate, analysis and research. Almost daily as I was writing this thesis, 
new media reports and studies were published about disinformation, which has 
                                                 
39 Metaxas et al. Do Retweets indicate interest, trust, agreement? arXiv:1411.3555v1 [cs.SI]  
40 Pal, A. Reviewing the Landscape of Research on the Threats to the Quality of User-Generated 






become a very hot topic. I have cited many of the studies, both contemporary and 
historical, that I have read while researching this thesis, to try to shed light on what 
disinformation is, whence it emanates, how we are trying to stop it, why some people 
fall for it, and why it is dangerous to them and to society.  
Among the researchers that I’ve studied for this report are: 
Stephan Lewandowsky, a cognitive scientist whose research includes deep 
dives into and analysis of how disinformation spreads and persists.  In one of scores 
of articles he has had published on the topic, Lewandowsky writes that retracting a 
piece of disinformation often does not stop its influence.41 However, repeating 
retractions, corrections and refutations enhances their impact, he notes – just as it 
does for disinformation.42 But the impact of repeating disinformation is greater than 
that of repeating a retraction, says Lewandowsky.43  
Acceptance of disinformation as fact can be reduced if people are explicitly 
warned that information they will receive could be misleading or outright false.44 
Such warnings are more effective if they are made before the disinformation is 
received and registered by the public, who “by default expect information presented 
to be valid,”45 writes Lewandowsky. Pre-empting disinformation with an a priori 
                                                 
41 Lewandowsky, S et al. Misinformation and its correction: continued influence and successful 
debiasing. Psychological Science in the Public Interest. 13(3) 106-131. 2012. Accessed online 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1529100612451018. (Note: Lewandowsky uses 
misinformation where I use disinformation.) 
42 Lewandowsky. p 116 
43 Lewandowsky,  p 117 






warning can change the expectation that all information a person is about to receive is 
valid, he writes. 
Kate Starbird. A focus of Starbird’s research is the use of social media 
during crisis events.46 Among dozens of research papers that Starbird has published, 
one looked at the spread of disinformation via Twitter following the bombings at the 
2013 Boston Marathon.47 Starbird et al found that corrections to misinformation are 
muted compared with the propagation of the misinformation. The research also 
pointed to the huge volume of information that circulated after the bombings, of 
which the overwhelming majority was disinformation.   
Nickolas Jones. While many studies focus on detecting falsehoods as they 
happen and on educating the public to recognize disinformation, and while social 
media outlets are cracking down on account holders who spread fake news, few 
studies look at what role officials who are involved in a disinformation attack should 
play to try to stop the flow of falsehoods. Among those that I found that do are a 
study by Jones et al. A doctoral student in the department of psychology and social 
behavior at the University of California, Irvine, Jones’s research focuses on the ways 
in which people’s interactions with technology, social media and other virtual 
environments impact psychological well-being and decision-making.  
 Jones and colleagues found that, in the absence of regular updates from 
trusted authorities during an active shooter lockdown on a university campus, 
                                                 
46 http://faculty.washington.edu/kstarbi/ 
47 Starbird, K. et al. Rumors, False Flags, and Digital Vigilantes: Misinformation on Twitter after the 






students and others involved in the crisis turned to unofficial sources – often Twitter – 
for information. Their study found that those who relied on social media for updates 
were exposed to more conflicting information than those who obtained information 
from traditional media, and often felt “helpless and without situational control, which 
can lead people to see patterns in the information obtained that are not present.”48 The 
researchers concluded that, to reduce rumor exposure and mitigate distress, officials 
should monitor social media channels during a crisis and release substantive updates 
on social media at regular intervals during the event.  
Christopher Paul is a senior social scientist at the RAND Corporation and 
professor at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. Paul collaborated with RAND 
Corporation behavioral and social scientist Miriam Matthews to produce a report 
titled “The Russian ‘Firehose of Falsehood’ Propaganda Model,”49 which looks at the 
evolution in recent years of Russian disinformation/propaganda and what might be 
done to counter it.  
  
                                                 
48 Jones, N et al. Rumors during a campus lockdown. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences Oct 2017. 114 (44) 11663-11668. http://www.pnas.org/content/114/44/11663  
49 Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews, The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model: 
Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. pp 9-10 







Disinformation and how it works 
 
Although disinformation has changed over time and continues to change with 
the times, and although technological advances make it easier to produce fake memes, 
doctored images and false stories, disinformation has retained some key 
characteristics over the ages.  
2.1. Characteristics of disinformation 
 
According to my research, the main features of disinformation are:  
• Omission – Purveyors of disinformation leave out key elements of 
stories as published or broadcast by traditional media.  
• Non-contextuality – Information is reported out of context. 
• Fabrication – Entire stories or facts are made up and published as 
stand-alone “news” articles, or inserted into stories or disseminated via 
social media. 
• Loaded language – Disinformation often uses language that appeals 
to emotions or stereotypes in a bid to influence an audience.  
• Lack of credible sourcing – Disinformation often offers no source or 
a dubious source. In some cases, the media outlet/website carrying the 
disinformation is itself a dubious source, such CNNchannel1.com, 





Kenyan elections, intended to make viewer/readers believe that they 
were by CNN.  
• Repetition – Repetition is considered to make a more persuasive 
argument for a fake story than hearing it from a single source. This 
persuasion of fact is underscored if each version of a story takes a 
different argument, but points to the same conclusion as the others.50  
• “Terror-indicating news” is a more recent addition to the 
disinformation toolbox. It’s often used by individuals or groups 
commenting in real-time during a crisis situation. Terror-indicating 
news is used almost exclusively to disparage/accuse migrant groups, 
particularly Muslims, of involvement in violent crises.51 For example, 
during the shooting at the Olympia shopping center in Munich in the 
summer of 2016, news spread on Twitter that the gunman had shouted 
“Allahu Akbar” or God is great in Arabic as he began his shooting 
rampage. The claim originated on an unverified Twitter account. It 
was quickly dispelled as false by the media and police—52 but not 
before an interview with someone claiming to have heard the gunman 
say it was carried by CNN.  
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2.2. How disinformation fools (some of) us 
 
Creators and purveyors of disinformation use simple techniques to try to get 
as many people as possible to subscribe to the version of events that they’re selling. 
For example, repeating true or false information leads to what’s called the illusion of 
truth effect. Also called the illusory truth effect, this uses repetition of a statement to 
increase a person’s belief in the truth of that statement.53 The propagandist-in-chief in 
Nazi Germany, Joseph Goebbels, who has been credited with saying, “Repeat a lie 
often enough and it becomes the truth,” understood and used the illusion of truth 
effect. 
Information overload – spreading as many conflicting messages as possible 
– seeks to convince an audience that there are so many versions of a story that it is 
impossible to find the truth.54 Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews say in their 
report for the RAND Corporation that Russian propaganda today uses “high numbers 
of channels and messages and a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or 
outright fictions” to create a “firehose of falsehood.”55 Examples of information 
overload are below in the section on Russia and its involvement in disinformation.  
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Most of the disinformation campaigns studied for this report involve groups or 
individuals affiliated with or supportive of the far-right, and/or who have ties to 
Russia. Russian disinformation campaigns, alleged and proven, during the 2016 U.S. 
elections, the Brexit vote in United Kingdom; the annexation of Crimea in eastern 
Ukraine, during a brief conflict with the former Soviet republic of Georgia in 2012, 
and the cyber attacks on another former Soviet republic, Estonia, in 2007, were all 
preceded by or run simultaneously with disinformation campaigns believed to have 
been orchestrated by Moscow.  
The RAND report notes that contemporary Russian propaganda or 
disinformation is “rapid, continuous, and repetitive, and it lacks commitment to 
consistency.”56 By circulating numerous versions of the same story, purveyors of 
disinformation seek to convince those receiving the information that “there are so 
many versions of events that it is impossible to find the truth,” says a report by the 
EU East StratCom Task Force published on the website of Italy’s Istituto per gli Studi 
di Politica Internazionale (ISPI).57  Like the RAND report, the EU East StratCom 
Task Force report focuses on Russian disinformation strategies and tactics. It cites 
multiple versions posted by Russian media of the tragic downing of a Malaysian 
Airlines flight over Eastern Ukraine as an example of how Russia tries to “pollute the 
information space and make the objective facts seem unrecognizable.”58 In July 2014, 
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with the finger of blame pointing at Russia after the passenger plane was shot down, 
Russian media reports claimed that the images of the Malaysian Airlines Boeing 
actually showed a Ukrainian Air Force Antonov that had been shot down by pro-
Kremlin separatists; that Ukraine was trying to shoot down Russian President 
Vladimir Putin’s plane; that the passengers on the Malaysian Airlines flight might 
have been dead when the aircraft took off from Amsterdam; or that the Boeing was 
the same Malaysian Airlines plane that vanished on a flight from Kuala Lumpur to 
China in March 2014.59  
A more recent example of inundating the media-sphere with different fake 
versions of the same story is illustrated by the Russian response to accusations that 
Moscow was behind the attempted murder in the U.K. of former Russian spy Sergei 
Skripal and his daughter, using the nerve agent Novichok. According to the EU vs 
Disinfo online newsletter, more than 20 different narratives have been published or 
broadcast in Russia about the attempted murder.60 “What was striking,” says an 
unsigned story on the EU-run website, “was how the stories – some appearing on the 
same state-controlled news outlet but completely contradicting one another – peddled 
multiple, unsubstantiated and often absurd conspiracy theories. This is perhaps the 
most classic of pro-Kremlin disinformation techniques: to confuse the wider audience 
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and at the same time to feed a loyal audience of disinformers ready to defend Russia 
with abundant lines to take.”61 
Among the many different explanations for who tried to kill the Skripals 
were:62  
• The United Kingdom did it to fuel anti-Russian sentiment (source: 
Russia 1 TV channel) 
• Ukraine did it to frame Russia (Russia 1) 
• The United States did it to destabilize the world (Russia 1) 
• Skripal’s future mother-in-law did it (Moskovsky Komsomolets: 
mk.ru) 
• Terrorists did it (Russian ministry of foreign affairs spokesperson) 
• A drone did it (Zvezda and Russian defense ministry) 
• Theresa May helped orchestrate the attack because she is a friend of 
CIA director Gina Haspel (Zvezda)63 
• American-British financier Bill Browder, whose lawyer was Sergey 
Magnitsky,64 did it (Russia 1) 
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As for the nerve agent Novichok, which chemical weapons experts say was 
used in the attack on the Skripals,65 the Russian media also sought to confuse through 
contradictory stories.66 These claimed, among other things that: 
• Russia has destroyed all its stockpiles of Novichok (Sputnik) 
• Russia never developed Novichok (Interfax) 
• There is no evidence that the nerve agent used against the Skripals was 
Novichok, and the British were struggling to identify the substance 
(RT). 
The reason Russian media post stories that appear to contradict each other is 
because, “If one falsehood or misrepresentation is exposed or is not well received, the 
propagandists will discard it and move on to a new (though not necessarily more 
plausible) explanation,” write Paul and Matthews.67 Furthermore, circulating multiple 
sources present a story on multiple outlets has been found to be more persuasive than 
having a single source present several different arguments, or multiple sources 
reporting the same version, according to a study by Stephen Harkins and Richard 
Petty.68  “Given the large number of cognitive tasks that people confront daily and 
given peoples' limited cognitive resources, choices must be made about which stimuli 
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deserve careful scrutiny and which are less worthy of thought,” wrote Harkins and 
Perry in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology in 1987. “If arguments 
from multiple sources are perceived as representing independent perspectives on an 
issue, then this information is more worthy of diligent consideration than information 
from only one perspective.” 
2.3 Russia  
 
“No one seems better resourced, more enthusiastic or 
as accomplished at [disinformation] as the Russians.” 
 Carl Miller on Wired.69 
 
Russian individuals and organizations have been accused of being behind the 
cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007,70 of creating and feeding disinformation into the 
United States in the run-up to the 2016 elections,71 of using propaganda, fake news, 
media manipulation and forgeries ahead of and during the occupation of Crimea and 
the war against Ukraine in Donbas,72 of web page defacements, denial of service, and 
distributed denial of service attacks on Georgian government, media and financial 
institutions, as well as other public and private targets.73  
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Russian military leaders have said information is part of their arsenal. "The 
day has come when we all have to admit that a word, a camera, a photo, the Internet, 
and information in general have become yet another type of weapon, yet another 
component of the armed forces,” said Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu in 
2015 at an awards ceremony for a competition for journalists. “This weapon can be 
used in a good and in a bad way. This is a weapon that was involved in various events 
in our country in different years, both in our defeats and in our victories.” he said. 74 
The MEDIA-ACE competition for which the awards were being presented was 
instituted by the Russian defense ministry as a way of “encouraging” members of the 
media in Russia who have “made a significant contribution to strengthening the 
Russian armed forces' positive image,” according to Russia’s Interfax news agency. 
However, when Russia is accused of being behind disinformation or cyber 
campaigns, it has dismissed the accusations as absurd and empty talk.75 Even the 
word dezinformatsiya is part of the Russian subterfuge surrounding disinformation – 
Stalin wanted a word that sounded Western European so that the concept would not 
be traced back to Moscow.  
The U.S. military considers that disinformation campaigns fall under the 
umbrella of information operations, which also include cyberwarfare.76 Like other 
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countries, including the U.S., Russia has used cyberwarfare, sometimes on its own 
and sometimes alongside conventional warfare, to achieve geopolitical goals. 
Cyberwarfare is an especially attractive way to influence the outcome of an event 
because “the global and anonymous nature of the internet makes it very difficult to 
prove a particular operation was state-sponsored.”77 Russia is exploiting that 
anonymity when it disseminates disinformation, too. “Russia has a long history of 
propaganda and disinformation operations—techniques it continues to adapt to the 
online environment,”78 E. J. Iasiello wrote in The U.S. Army War College Quarterly. 
2.4 Who believes disinformation 
 
“While any group can come to believe false 
information, misinformation is currently 
predominantly a pathology of the right…” 
Report by Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein 
Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy 
 
Extremist groups on both sides of the political spectrum use disinformation 
and social media to spread their beliefs and secure greater control for themselves or 
others who share their ideology. These groups “leverage both the techniques of 
participatory culture and the affordances of social media to spread their various 
                                                 
77 Dougherty, J. The mouse clicks of August: Hybrid warfare, nation-state actors and the future of 
cybersecurity. Small Wars Journal. Accessed online at http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/mouse-
clicks-august-hybrid-warfare-nation-state-actors-and-future-cybersecurity  
78 Iasiello, EJ. Russia’s improved information operations: From Georgia to Crimea. The U.S. Army 






beliefs. Taking advantage of the opportunity the internet presents for collaboration, 
communication, and peer production, these groups target vulnerabilities in the news 
media ecosystem to increase the visibility of and audience for their messages,” write 
Alice Marwick and Rebecca Lewis in a report79 for the Data & Society research 
institute, which looks at the ways the same innovative tools that are positively 
transforming society can also be harmful.  
Many of the groups that spread disinformation are on the far-right of the 
political spectrum, according to different groups of researchers.80 81 82 Right-wing 
disinformation most often originates in a country, like Hungary, or politically 
motivated organization83 espousing right-wing ideologies.84 For example, since 
Viktor Orban and the far right surged to power in Hungary in 2006, “at least 
90 Hungarian-language fake news sites have emerged (mainly run by Hungarian far-
right actors), most of them spreading lies and rumours about refugees,” writes 
Krisztian Simon,  a doctoral candidate at the Freie Universität in Berlin, in the Green 
European Journal.85 
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In the U.S., an analysis conducted of more than 1.25 million stories published 
online between April 1, 2015, and Election Day 2016 found that a right-wing media 
network with Breitbart at its nucleus “developed as a distinct and insulated media 
system, using social media as a backbone to transmit a hyper-partisan perspective to 
the world.”86 The media groups orbiting around Breitbart included Fox News, the 
Daily Caller, the Gateway Pundit, the Washington Examiner and Infowars, among 
others. All of these media outlets have published false information,87 have a distinctly 
pro-Trump bias and have succeeded not only in setting the agenda for conservative 
media but “also strongly influenced the broader media agenda, in particular coverage 
of Hillary Clinton.”88 
A Buzzfeed analysis showed websites on the extremes of the political 
spectrum are causing the political divide in the U.S. to deepen. An analysis by 
Buzzfeed of three hyper-partisan right-wing Facebook pages—Eagle Rising, Right 
Wing News and Freedom Daily—found that 38 percent of all posts were either a 
mixture of true and false or mostly false information, compared to 19 percent of posts 
from three hyper-partisan left-wing pages—The Other 98%, Occupy Democrats and 
Addicting Info—that were either a mixture of true and false or mostly false.89 The 
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rapid growth of Facebook pages like these—some have more followers than 
mainstream political pages –and the fabricated content they publish suggest that “the 
best way to grow an audience for political content on the world's biggest social 
network is to eschew factual reporting and instead play to partisan biases using false 
or misleading information that simply tells people what they want to hear,” Buzzfeed 
concluded.   
Breitbart and other U.S. right-wing sites were among the most popular 
domains in 2017 out of 600 Twitter accounts that amplified messages seen as 
benefiting the Kremlin, according to the German Marshall Fund in the U.S.90 
Breitbart’s popularity may have been helped by the fact that Republicans are more 
likely than Democrats to believe disinformation, although a majority of followers of 
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A brief history of disinformation 
“I believe that the more you know about the past, the 
better you are prepared for the future.” 
 – Theodore Roosevelt 
Disinformation existed back in Roman times, during the Cold War, and the 
centuries in between. It was used for the same purposes then as now—to sway 
opinion and promote a viewpoint that the producer and purveyor of the 
disinformation wants to bring to the fore.  For Maxim Eristavi, a former newsroom 
manager in Moscow and now Atlantic Council fellow and co-founder of an 
independent news outlet in Kiev, disinformation ‘went global’ in 2014, when Russian 
propaganda and falsehoods were part of the weaponry deployed by Moscow in the 
war in eastern Ukraine.92 Prior to that, however, eastern Europeans had been fighting 
Russian-driven disinformation for years. Understanding that disinformation is not 
new, how it has been used over the centuries to achieve goals, often political, and 
how the tools used to deploy it have evolved are key to being able to spot and 
potentially stop disinformation today.  
                                                 








A key change to disinformation is that it has increased in volume and can be 
shared at lightning speed today93 versus in Ancient Roman times or, more recently, 
during the Cold War.  
In the historical cases that follow, when a trusted authority intervened and 
refuted disinformation, as the U.S. did when the Soviets spread a false story about 
AIDS having been created at Fort Detrick in Maryland, the life and spread of 
disinformation was curtailed. But disinformation was not stopped entirely. These 
historical case studies show that, once a false story starts circulating, it’s hard to get 
rid of every trace of it. 
3.1 Disinformation in Ancient Rome 
 
One of the first recorded disinformation campaigns may have happened some 
2,050 years ago.  There are some odd similarities with the political world of today. 
It started after Julius Caesar found himself on the wrong side of republicans 
by declaring himself dictator perpetuo – often translated as dictator for life94 -- which 
led to his murder on the Senate floor in 44 B.C. Caesar’s death sparked a succession 
battle between his adopted son, Octavian, and Marc Antony, a general and close ally 
of the slain dictator perpetuo. This succession battle was marked, and possibly 
decided, by disinformation and the lack of a reaction to it. 
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 At first, Octavian and Antony were allies after Caesar’s death. With Marcus 
Aemilius Lepidus, they formed a triumvirate, which sought to avenge Caesar’s 
murder and stabilize the government. Lepidus was forced out of the ruling trio after 
repeatedly failing in battle, whereupon Octavian took control of the western half of 
the Roman Empire and Antony the east. It was around this time that Antony began a 
romantic liaison with the Egyptian queen, Cleopatra, who had also had a romantic 
liaison with Caesar and had borne him a son. Never at ease with the idea that Caesar 
had a son – and potential successor – with the Egyptian queen, and angry that Antony 
was lavishing attention on Cleopatra instead of his second wife back in Rome, who 
happened to be Octavian’s sister, Octavian decided to launch a disinformation war, 
alongside a physical war, against Antony.95 96 
Octavian used disinformation to reduce Antony’s chances of acceding to 
power. His tactics involved playing on Romans’ fears of foreigners and strong 
women. Exploiting a fear of foreigners and strong women was also a hallmark of the 
disinformation campaign waged during the 2016 U.S. election. He used “short, sharp 
slogans written upon coins in the style of archaic tweets”97 to spread a negative 
message about Antony. Historians say he also made public what he claimed was 
Antony’s will after two deserters from Antony’s camp told Octavian that “its 
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contents, if published, would damn Antony’s reputation.” The deserters told Octavian 
that the will was in the safekeeping of the Vestal Virgins of Rome.98  
Some experts still question whether the will was a forgery,99 noting that 
Antony was too astute and well-informed to have written a will that ignored some of 
the most basic Roman laws. In particular, they wonder why Antony would have 
named Cleopatra and her children as his heritors when Roman law forbade peregrini, 
or foreigners, from benefiting from the will of a citizen. 
From Octavian’s point of view, releasing the will achieved a goal. “[I]t was 
unimpeachable evidence as far as it went,” that Antony had spent too much time in 
the eastern part of the Roman Empire with Cleopatra and had become un-Roman, 
“and this caused the Romans in their indignation to believe that the other reports in 
circulation were also true”100 and “rekindled hatred”101 of Antony.  
The emergence of the will was well-timed for Octavian – just as then 
FBI Director James Comey’s announcement days before the 2016 presidential 
election that his agency was investigating another batch of Hillary Clinton 
emails was well-timed for Donald Trump. That some parts of the will may 
have been forged was immaterial – a reminder of the 2016 U.S. election 
where many voters in Trump’s base overlooked the falseness of some 
circulating stories about Hillary Clinton because they strongly disliked her.  
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The story of Antony’s will being offered to Octavian also recalls the 
incident where music promoter Rob Goldstone told Donald Trump Jr. in an 
email exchange that the “crown prosecutor of Russia” had “some official 
documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings 
with Russia and would be very useful to your father.”102 
The Octavian and Antony rift used many of the same techniques as are used 
today to disseminate disinformation: falsification of at least part of Antony’s will, 
repetition of negative claims, playing on prevalent fears and prejudices, opportunism 
and timing. Octavian shared the disinformation about Antony as widely as he could, 
given the communications means at his disposal. He read the will aloud in the Senate 
and had a decree issued that it be posted in the Forum and dispatched by messengers 
around the empire. Today’s equivalent would be to have a story published, broadcast 
and shared on social media. We will probably never know whether Antony’s inaction 
against the disinformation campaign helped to decide his fate. 
3.2 Cold War disinformation 
 
Fast forward to the 1980s and the Cold War. In 1987, a Department of State 
report accused the Soviets of using forged documents103 104 and a disinformation 
campaign to undermine the image of the U.S. The aim of the disinformation was to 
“convince the world that the AIDS virus … had been “manufactured” as a result of 
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genetic engineering experiments conducted at Fort Detrick, Maryland.”105 Just as the 
goal in ancient Rome had been to discredit Antony in the eyes of Romans, the forged 
documents and fake news about HIV were an attempt to discredit the United States 
and generate anti-American feelings around the world; repeat Soviet propaganda that 
the U.S. was violating conventions that ban biological weapons and to counter U.S. 
accusations that the Soviets had done the same; to undermine defense arrangements 
between the U.S. and its allies; to pressure U.S. allies to seek the withdrawal of U.S. 
forces from their territory by linking the spread of AIDS to U.S. forces stationed 
abroad; and to discourage contact with all Americans including tourists, diplomats 
and businesspeople, by claiming that “American imperialism is responsible for a 
frightening disease that has made its way into the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.”106 
The story started doing the rounds in 1983, the year AIDS was first attributed 
to a virus.107 This was just four years after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and two years after the inauguration in 1981 of Ronald Reagan as U.S. president. 
Reagan very rapidly boosted the budget for the U.S. Department of Defense, 
suspended arms reduction talks and reinstated work on missiles and bombers.108 109 
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These moves caused Soviet leader Yuriy Andropov, who was reportedly a little 
paranoid to begin with, to be convinced the U.S. was actively planning for nuclear 
war. He ordered KGB operatives around the world to look for signs of a first strike. 
On September 30, 1982, KGB agents in the U.S. were “instructed to counterattack 
Washington’s aggressive stance with active measures.”110 
The Soviets knew that active measures worked best when they blended in with 
politics, culture and specific events.111 In the case of the AIDS story, Moscow knew 
that chemical/biological warfare was of great concern to Westerners and could be 
exploited for disinformation purposes. So a letter, purportedly from a well-known 
American scientist who wished to remain anonymous,112 was sent to a pro-Moscow 
Indian newspaper, The Patriot. The letter said AIDS had been isolated and spread by 
U.S. scientists who were engaged in biological warfare preparations.113   
The allegations in that letter were repeated numerous times in other 
publications. Two years later, for instance, in Soviet newspaper Literaturnaya 
Gazeta, writer Valentin Zapevalov said the United States had found AIDS while 
“seeking dangerous viruses.” 114 A couple of years after that, in 1987, the Soviets 
began “repeating and embellishing allegations published throughout 1986 and adding 
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distinct arms control themes as the 15th anniversary of the 1972 Biological Weapons 
Convention approached.”115  
The U.S. refuted the allegations each time they appeared, but both the 
appearance and refutation of disinformation happened at a much slower pace than 
today – via press release, diplomatic cables, articles in journals, etc.  It was only in 
the late 1980s when HIV began spreading through Russia and the Eastern Bloc that 
Moscow began to tone down the anti-U.S. AIDS disinformation campaign to allow 
Soviet scientists to collaborate with their U.S. counterparts.  A disavowal by the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences116 that AIDS had been created artificially was published 
in the Soviet official newspaper, Izvestia. But on the same day, the Sovetskaya 
Rossiya newspaper published an article repeating the AIDS disinformation and 
defending the right of the Russian press to “report different views.”117  
The AIDS disinformation campaign had largely ceased inside the Soviet 
Union by the summer of 1988, but the story continued to appear in other countries’ 
newspapers. In 1991, after the demise of the Soviet Union and amid a resurgence of 
hardliner ideology in Moscow, a newspaper in Zimbabwe reported that HIV was 
manufactured in a U.S. government lab. That report added a new accusation—that the 
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U.S. had exported “AIDS-oiled condoms” to the Soviet Union and Third World to 
spread HIV.118   
In the early 2000s, the Soviet disinformation campaign about AIDS was again 
given new life, this time on U.S. home turf when Dr. Boyd E. Graves, a lawyer who 
became an HIV/AIDS activist after he was diagnosed with the virus in the 1990s,119 
said AIDS was developed by the U.S. government to “thin the Black Population.”120 
By this time, what started as disinformation had grown into a conspiracy theory, 
which over the years has endured and caused damage to those who have bought into 
it. For example, in 2005, nearly half of African Americans surveyed for a study121 
said they believed HIV was a man-made virus; nearly a quarter said they thought 
AIDS was produced in a U.S. government laboratory, and more than four in 10 said 
people who take antiretrovirals, which at the time were relatively new and untested, 
were guinea pigs for the government.  
The authors of the study about beliefs about HIV/AIDS also found that men 
who believed AIDS conspiracy theories had more negative attitudes toward condoms 
and were less likely to consistently use them than those who did not buy into 
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conspiracies about the virus. Another study, published in 2008,122 found that black 
South Africans who believed HIV was manufactured by white people to reduce or 
control the black population were less likely to be tested for the virus, a key step to 
stemming the spread of HIV/AIDS. Yet another study,123 conducted among African-
American HIV-infected men who have sex with men, found that those who endorsed 
AIDS conspiracy theories were more likely to be non-adherent to antiretroviral 
therapy. That study was published in 2010. The disinformation put forward by the 
Soviets about AIDS being manufactured by the Americans had endured, in one form 
or another, for more than 35 years, even surviving the fall of the USSR and several 
refutations by U.S. and international scientists, diplomats and other trusted officials.  
The AIDS disinformation campaign waged by the Soviets and carried on for 
years after the end of the USSR illustrates one way that disinformation is dangerous. 
Belief in the disinformation may have endured in a small minority of people, but the 
potential consequences of the disinformation on that minority were large and 
potentially serious. If a sector of the population subscribes to a false narrative, 
disinformation can form the basis for political and societal decisions they make – 
such as not getting tested for HIV, not using condoms, voting to leave the European 
Union which could run counter to a society’s best interest.124 “If individuals are 
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misinformed, they may … make decisions for themselves and their families that are 
not in their best interest and can have serious consequences,” write Lewandowsky et 
al.125 
  









Disinformation has played a role in numerous events and crises this century 
and last. Some of these crises are well known to Americans, while others happened 
without being noticed on this side of the Atlantic. For example, in 1991, as the Soviet 
Union was in the throes of collapse, Russian troops stormed the Vilnius television 
tower in Lithuania, killing 14 unarmed people. A newscast in Leningrad blamed the 
deaths on "traffic accidents" and "heart attacks,"126 The newscast “showed a man with 
crazed eyes drinking from a flaming bowl” as the anchor said: “It seems the 
Lithuanians are prepared to drain the bitter cup of nationalism to its 
dregs."127  Estonia was also accused of excessive nationalism and Nazism by the 
Russians when the small Baltic state became the first nation to come under cyber 
attack by another nation. Some have called the weeks’-long cyber and disinformation 
attacks Web War I.128  
4.1 Estonia  
 
More than a decade ago, Estonia fought off months of disinformation, 
physical violence and cyber attacks prompted by a decision to move the statue of a 
Red Army soldier from the center of Tallinn – a decision it made good on in late 
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April 2007. Leading up to, during and after the removal of the Bronze Soldier statue, 
the rioting that ensued and the cyber attacks that disabled much of the country, 
including the government, banking and services sectors, the flow of disinformation 
from Moscow and its surrogates was almost unrelenting. When the cyber attacks 
began, mainstream media were among the first targets. Twitter was still in its infancy 
in 2007, so the Estonian authorities were attacked from and fought their 
disinformation battles mainly in online chatrooms and forums. They also fought to 
protect access to the internet in the highly wired Baltic country to allow domestic 
users of the web to continue to access it and go about their daily lives.  
Vladimir Putin, who had come to power in Russia six years before the first 
major clashes over the statue with Estonia in 2006, set the tone to be taken in the 
disinformation campaign in Estonia. Putin said he wanted to “restore a version of 
history that was very similar to the earlier Soviet version of history.”129 Russian 
propaganda and disinformation during the Bronze Soldier crisis in Estonia followed 
the logic that those who do not accept that the Red Army liberated Europe from 
fascism support fascism and do not deserve respect.130 The Russians posted videos 
during the crisis, showing Estonian police arresting rioters, who were portrayed as 
law-abiding citizens, while Nazi music played in the background; depicting the 
Estonian ambassador to Moscow with a Hitler moustache; and writing the name of 
Estonian Prime Minister Andrus Ansip with two S’s – AnSSip – as in the Nazi 
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German Schutzstaffel, to drive home their message that Estonia was behaving like 
World War II fascists.131 Russian media also martyrized 20-year-old Russian Dmitriy 
Ganin, the only person to die during the rioting. Some reports in Russian media said 
Ganin died trying to protect the Bronze Soldier statue,132 while others said he was 
tortured by the Estonian police.133 Estonian media immediately counteracted the 
reports coming out of Russia but the refutations in the Estonian press fell on deaf ears 
in the country’s Russian population, who don’t speak Estonian and get their 
information from Russian media, most of which are controlled by the state.  
To this day, the Ganin case remains a hot topic in Russia and is revived 
regularly.134 135 The Estonians continue to refute the accusations136 each time new 
ones arise. Estonian prosecutors last year closed their investigation into the Russian 
youth’s death.137 
The Estonians may appear to be the losers in what was “the first cyber attack 
in history that affected a country nation-wide,” according to Helen Popp, counselor 
for cyber issues at the Estonian Embassy in Washington, D.C. But by taking quick, 
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decisive steps to counter the cyber attacks on its infrastructure, Estonia avoided a 
complete, costly shutdown of the entire country, and impressed on its NATO partners 
the need to beef up cyber security capabilities.  
Furthermore, by resisting the Russian disinformation offensive, Estonia was 
able to prevent Russia from achieving its agenda – to deepen the divide between 
Estonians and Russians who live in the country. The aim of Russia’s “formidable 
propaganda machine” in Estonia over the years has been “to shape, in overt and 
covert ways, the perceptions of ethnic non-Estonians [i.e. Russian-speakers]—a task 
at which it largely succeeds.”138 By portraying Estonians as violators of human rights 
who desecrated the memory of Russian soldiers who fought the Nazis,139 Moscow 
used disinformation to try to deepen the divide in Estonia between Russian-speakers 
and native Estonians, just as it tried in the run-up to the 2016 U.S. elections to deepen 
racial and political divides between Americans.140 Estonia has stepped up efforts to 
integrate its Russian-speakers, who make up around 25 percent of the population. 
Estonia’s public broadcaster, ERR, announced in May 2018 that it will expand the 
reach of its Russian-language channel to the entire country,141 and Prime Minister Jüri 
                                                 
138 Kivirahk, J. Integrating Estonia’s Russian-Speaking Population: Findings of National Defense 
Opinion Surveys. ICDS report. P 3. December 2014. 
https://www.icds.ee/fileadmin/media/icds.ee/failid/Juhan_Kivirahk_-_Integrating_Estonias_Russian-
Speaking_Population.pdf  
139 Lucas, E & Pomeranzev, P. Winning the information war. Center for European Policy Analysis 
report. p.23. August 2016. https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2706  
140 Ioffe, J. The history of Russian involvement in America’s race wars. The Atlantic. Oct. 21, 2017. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/russia-facebook-race/542796/  
141 Unsigned. Estonian pubcaster expanding reach of Russian-language channel. Digital TV Europe. 






Ratas has pledged to ease citizenship requirements and boost economic development 
in parts of the country where Russians live.  
4.1.1. Disinformation and propaganda 
 
Estonian lawmakers voted months before things came to a head with Russia 
over the Bronze Soldier statue to have it removed from Tallinn city center. From the 
time the Estonian government began mulling moving the statue until months after it 
actually did, Estonia became the target of disinformation and propaganda campaigns.  
One of the early anti-Estonian propaganda campaigns linked to the statue 
came in 2006 when the Embassy of the Russian Federation helped produce a 
propaganda film named “Estonia – the Crossroads of History.” A statement issued by 
the Russian embassy in Tallinn to coincide with the film’s release in December of 
2006 said it depicted “Russia's principled position on the inadmissibility of revising 
the outcome of World War II.” Again, Estonians saw things differently. According to 
the Baltic Times newspaper, the Russian version of history portrayed in the movie 
tried to “make Estonians somehow culpable for fascism and the war crimes of 
National Socialist Germany.”142  
When the film was released, Estonian lawmakers were already mulling 
moving the statue. A bill presented in the Estonian parliament prior to the elections in 
March 2007, which saw Andrus Ansip’s Estonian Reform Party emerge as the largest 
in the legislature, proposed that the statue be moved to a military cemetery in the 
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suburbs of Tallinn, and those buried underneath the statue be exhumed, identified and 
reburied at the statue’s new site. The Russian media called these plans disrespectful 
and Estonians blasphemous.  
When the statue was moved in April 2007, a website called 
EnglishRussia.com wrote that the Bronze Soldier, “…from Russian point of view 
commemorates the glory of Soviet forces liberating Estonia and Europe from the Nazi 
invasion. From the Estonian official point of view it is the monument of the invaders 
because Estonians were fighting together with German army against Soviet and thus 
it can’t stand anymore in Estonia.”143 The site said the statue was demolished, not 
dismantled and moved, and that all that was left of it were “just two pair of bronze 
boots.” Media in Russia reported distortions, half-truths and outright lies alongside 
images from Tallinn.144 One Russian journalist reportedly had Russian activists stage 
a demonstration at the site of the Bronze Soldier, and Russian media “portrayed 
Russian youth gangs who went on a rampage of vandalism” as peaceful 
demonstrators145 and studiously avoided airing footage of the vandalism in the 
Estonian capital. “By combining disinformation with footage from the city (even if 
the footage was staged), the programs gave a veneer of veracity to their content,” 
write Lucas and Pomeranzev.146  
Correcting the disinformation about the statue being demolished was easy – 
Russian lawmakers attended the same ceremony as I did, within days of the statue 
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being moved, at a military cemetery on the outskirts of Tallinn where the statue was 
reinstalled. As for fighting alongside the Nazis, Estonians note that some in the Baltic 
state welcomed the invading Germans with open arms and flowers after nearly two 
years under the Soviets, from 1939-1941, during which tens of thousands of 
Estonians were deported to Siberia or executed. But fight alongside the Germans, 
they did not, the Estonians say. In fact, they note, by the time the Soviets returned to 
re-occupy Estonia in 1944, the Germans had already withdrawn and the Red Army 
soldiers lowered the Estonian flag, not the Nazi swastika, when they entered Tallinn. 
Eight times more Estonians were killed under Soviet occupation than German, 
according to Estonian nationalist Tiit Madison, who spent several years in a Russian 
prison camp for anti-Soviet propaganda.147   
In 2006, a group with the Russian name Nochnoy Dozor, or Night Patrol, was 
set up in Estonia to “defend” the Bronze Soldier. The Russians said Nochnoy Dozor 
were anti-fascist and, therefore, patriotic. Prior to the statue’s removal, Nochnoy 
Dozor made several public statements, often calling Estonian politicians Nazis. 
Nochnoy Dozor was suspected by the Estonian media and officials of helping to 
organize the rioting that erupted in Tallinn after the statue was moved.  
Russian TV channel RTR on April 27, 2007 – immediately after the statue’s 
removal – carried a phone interview with a Nochnoy Dozor member who claimed he 
was in a “place of detention” following the rioting. The RTR interviewee said one 
person had been beaten to death and his body taken away “in view of the other 
                                                 






detainees.” To refute these rumors, Estonia allowed a group of Russian lawmakers to 
visit the warehouses by Tallinn’s waterfront where the youth were being held. I was 
with the Duma representatives when they visited the warehouse area, but for legal and 
safety reasons, I was not allowed into the warehouse itself. When I spoke to the 
Russian members of parliament after they’d visited the warehouse-turned-detention-
center, one of them, Leonid Slutsky, did not describe anything resembling 
mistreatment or inhumane conditions in the warehouses. The allegations of abuse and 
extrajudicial killings of Russians by the Estonians ended up fading away.   
But the disinformation campaigns were not done. Six months after the statue 
had been moved and the bodies buried under it exhumed, identified, and reburied, 
Nochnoy Dozor posted disinformation on Russian language news sites in Estonia, 
saying the Estonian currency would be devalued by 50 percent at 4 p.m. and bank 
ATMs would cease to operate at 11 p.m. The Bank of Estonia quickly issued a denial 
and assured the public that the Kroon, Estonia’s pre-Euro currency, was not going to 
be devalued and ATMs would not go dark. But that didn’t stop many Russian-
speakers in Estonia from panicking and making a run on exchange bureaus, emptying 
them of foreign currencies. A large part of the problem in this disinformation 
campaign was that residents of Estonia who do not speak Estonian do not follow 
Estonian media, including Russian-language media.148 Television was, at the time, 
the main source of information for people over 20 years of age, but nearly 75 percent 
                                                 






of Russians in Estonia watched programs broadcast by Russian state TV channels, 
“which are conspicuous by virtue of their anti-Estonian attitudes.”149  
4.1.2. The delivery method 
 
Cyber attacks, disinformation campaign and physical violence or conventional 
warfare are elements of Russia’s 21st century modus operandi for conflict – hybrid 
warfare. Hybrid warfare has been defined as a strategy that employs conventional 
military force supported by irregular and cyber warfare tactics.150 In testimony to the 
U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services, the RAND 
Corporation’s Christopher Chivvis defined hybrid warfare as a distinctly Russian 
thing where a broad range of subversive instruments, many of them nonmilitary, are 
deployed to further Russian national interests, often at the expense of the U.S. and its 
allies.151  
Social media was still in its infancy in 2007, so the disinformation attacks that 
encouraged people to take down the online presence of what was at the time the most 
wired nation in Europe played out in closed, online Russian chat rooms and public 
online forums. Detailed instructions posted online in Russian explained how to launch 
an attack, who and what to target, and when to launch a coordinated attack. For the 
most part, these instructions were written in simple terms so that ordinary, non-
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computer-savvy individuals and their babushka could help to incapacitate Estonia, 
where 60 percent of the population relied on the Internet for “crucial” services every 
day, and nearly all banking transactions occurred online.152 
The cyber attacks were waged at three levels, or on three fronts, to maintain 
the military analogy: by individuals, dubbed “script kiddies” who copied programs, 
line for line, off hacker sites; by networks of computers around the world, called 
botnets, that had been hijacked by hackers and began flooding certain internet 
addresses with floods of data; and by hackers who deleted content on individual 
websites and replaced it with their own messages153  
Disinformation played a vital role in the whipping the human attackers – 
particularly the script kiddies – into a frenzy. As the script kiddies used ping attacks – 
a request, repeated hundreds of times per second, for a response from a web server – 
to overwhelm Estonian servers, they were “stoked into a fervor on Russian-language 
chat rooms.”154  
“First they were goaded by overheated rhetoric about the April 27 removal of 
the statue. A week later, hundreds of posts called for a coordinated attack at the stroke 
of midnight on May 9, the day Russia celebrates its World War II victory. ‘You do 
not agree with the policy of eSStonia???’ 155 demanded a user named Victoris on a 
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Russian online forum. ‘You may think you have no influence on the situation??? You 
CAN have it on the Internet!’”156 
At the same time, botnets bombarded key Estonian websites, including 
government officials’ and agencies’ sites, political parties, banks, media, and 
communications companies, with distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks – 
designed to cause a site to crash. Hackers took over selected sites and changed their 
content. Like the script kiddies, the hackers communicated among themselves and 
posted their intent on public forums.157 An investigation by ICDS found that calls to 
attack Estonia’s connectivity were also being put out on Russian chat forums, 
2ch.ru and forum.xaker.ru, and discussed and coordinated in Internet Relay Chat 
environments, which facilitate group discussions. The Estonian authorities were 
monitoring the chatrooms throughout and were able to mount a defense of Estonia’s 
internet connectedness, without which the country would grind to a halt.  
At the end of April 2007, three days after the attacks had begun, the Estonian 
authorities blocked most internet traffic arriving in Estonia from IP addresses with the 
extension .ru (Russia) and from other foreign IP addresses. In the first few days of 
May, two telecommunications companies (Elion and Elisa) that provide internet 
services and the Postimees media group, publisher of the country’s flagship 
newspaper Postimees, were also targeted by the attackers.  The newspaper’s IT 
manager decided as the attacks ramped up to block international requests to the paper 
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in order to preserve Estonians’ access. The tactic worked: Postimees’ website 
“became accessible again within Estonia, but at a cost. Estonia's leading news outlet 
could not tell the world what was going on in its own country.”158  
Prime Minister Andris Ansip told the new U.S. ambassador to Tallinn, Stanley 
Davis Philips, that the well-organized attacks sought to undermine government 
institutions in Estonia. Ansip added that when Estonian websites were down, Russian 
websites filled the void and spread disinformation. 159 Estonian Defense Minister Jaak 
Aaviksoo said he believed Russia’s strategic objective in mounting the cyber attacks 
and spreading disinformation about Estonia was to create tensions within Europe and 
destabilize the EU.160 
The attacks ended on May 19 after Estonia “pulled the plug” and largely 
disappeared from the internet.161  Some considered this a victory for whomever had 
perpetrated the attacks – Estonians and others in the EU and NATO believed Russia 
was responsible,162 but Moscow denied having anything to do with the cyber 
onslaught. But Russia failed to advance its agenda of creating tensions within Estonia, 
and between Estonia and Europe. It also failed to destabilize the EU and NATO. In 
fact, the opposite happened. A research paper for NATO said the attacks “were a true 
wake-up call for NATO, offering a practical demonstration that cyber attacks could 
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now cripple an entire nation which is heavily dependent on IT networks.”163 A year 
after the attacks, NATO established a cyber defense research center in Tallinn and 
beefed up its cyber war capabilities. Furthermore, because they were not very 
sophisticated, the cyber attacks had little effect on Estonia’s IT network, and because 
Estonia is a relatively small country with highly trained IT experts and a Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT), its cyber experts were able to mobilize cyber 
defense teams and take speedy action to protect Estonia’s  networks. 164 
Israeli cyber security expert Gadi Evron, who traveled to Estonia to lend a 
hand during the 2007 attacks, said in a post-mortem of the crisis, “It took Hillar 
(Aarelaid) and the others about three weeks to start getting things under control, but 
they did. Persistence and a focus on hardening the nation’s defenses slowed the 
momentum of the attackers, slowing them down before finally turning them back.”165 
The attacks on Estonia made clear that cyber and information warfare are “about 
people. Machines were just what people were using,” said Evron.166 “The goal is to 
disarm the enemy by causing them to disarm themselves,” he said, citing Russian 
strategist S. P. Rastorguev,167 who liked to explain information warfare by telling the 
fable of a fox that wanted to eat a turtle but couldn’t until he convinced her to take off 
her shell. Information warfare, Rastorguev would say, is the purposeful training of an 
enemy on how to remove its own shell. Russia has understood there is a human side 
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of information warfare, while the West, and the U.S. in particular, “concentrate on the 
technical aspects alone,”168 said Evron. 
“Estonia taught me that … the human element should not be separated from 
the computerized aspects,” Evron said.169 
4.2 How Georgia won a disinformation battle with Russia but 
lost the war 
 
A year after Estonia’s cyber war, conflict broke out between Russia and 
Georgia over the autonomous region of South Ossetia in Georgia. The conflict lasted 
less than a week and marked the first time that cyber and disinformation attacks were 
synchronized with major combat actions.170 171 More than 50 websites in Georgia 
were “attacked by rogue elements within Russia” immediately prior to the start of 
fighting.172 “With Georgian government websites shut down, the Russian story of its 
army coming to the defense of South Ossetia in the face of Georgian assault gained 
currency,” Robert Cutler, an analyst at the Central Asia Caucasus Institute (CACI) 
wrote around the time of  the conflict.173  
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Russia and Georgia recognized the importance of and sought to control the 
flow of information to the global community during the conflict. Russia’s main 
message to the international community was that Georgia and its president, Mikheil 
Saakashvili, were the aggressors in the conflict and Russia was merely trying to 
defend its citizens living in South Ossetia.174 The Russian media and “the highest 
Russian leaders”175 accused Saakashvili of war crimes, repeatedly citing reports that 
2,000 civilians had been killed and more than half the population of 70,000 of the 
main city of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, had fled when Georgia launched an attack on 
the city.176   
Initially, Russia appeared to have the upper hand in the information war. The 
narrative that Russia was merely responding to Georgian aggression to protect its 
citizens took hold and continued to dominate discussions even after evidence came to 
light that Russia was in South Ossetia before the conflict broke out.177 The 
overwhelming majority of respondents to a CNN poll taken at the time – 92 percent – 
said they believed Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia was justified,178 although 
sources say the poll results were skewed after it was amplified by Russian bloggers 
who circulated it widely among Russians.179  
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The Georgians quickly launched an information counter-attack, relying on the 
most widely used media sources of the day, television and websites, to share their 
version of events. Saakashvili’s official website, which had been taken down in the 
cyber attacks on Georgia, was re-established as a page on the website of Polish 
President Lech Kaczynski, and other Georgian government websites reappeared as 
blogs “behind the protection of google.com.”180 In dozens of appearances on Western 
television and in discussions at Western think-tanks during the five-day conflict, the 
Georgians asserted they were the victims and Russia the aggressor.181  
“Saakashvili’s presence on CNN and other Western stations, and his and the 
Georgian leadership’s command of foreign languages, have enabled them to get their 
message across effectively,” wrote Cutler.182 In contrast, Russian leaders held “no 
spontaneous interviews, even with representatives of Russian media,” he wrote.  
Georgia also put at least one E.U. public relations firm to work spreading the 
Georgian version of events in the South Ossetia conflict.183 “Almost hourly over the 
five-day war, press releases landed on foreign news desks,” reported Peter Wilby in 
The Guardian in August 2008.184 The press releases included trigger terms designed 
to pique the interest of international copy tasters and news editors: “‘Russia continues 
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to attack civilian population’ … Tbilisi was ‘intensively’ bombed. A downed Russian 
plane turned out to be ‘nuclear’… A ‘humanitarian wheat shipment’ was blocked … 
‘invading Russian forces’ began ‘the occupation of Georgia,’” read the releases’ 
headlines, according to Wilby.  
The Georgian information strategy achieved the desired result. “Most 
[Western] newspapers hadn't a clue what was going on and lacked sufficient 
resources to find out,” Wilby wrote. “So skilfully presented PR was at a premium. 
Most journalists treated it with at least some scepticism, but it inevitably had an 
effect. If there was a military war, there was also an information one, and Georgia got 
the better of it.”185  
A review of the Russian military’s performance in the Georgia incursion 
concurred that Georgia had won the information battle. Russia had shown 
“deficiencies in both the information-technical and information-psychological 
domains” and Georgia had “won the hearts and minds of the global community even 
though Russia won the physical battlespace.”186 Russia is still present in South 
Ossetia and is one of four countries that have recognized its independence. 
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4.3 German newspaper reacts to disinformation 
 
 “We at Breitbart News … take the utmost care to 
present facts.” 
 - London Editor in Chief Raheem Kassam 
 
In January 2017, alt-right online publication Breitbart News’ London bureau 
published a story that claimed “a mob of more than 1,000 men chanted ‘Allahu 
Akhbar’” and burnt down Germany’s “oldest” church during New Year’s celebrations 
in Dortmund on Dec. 31, 2016.187 The Dortmund police188 and the reporter who 
covered the New Year’s Eve celebrations189 for the Ruhr Nachrichten newspaper 
immediately took to Twitter and the online edition of the paper, and gave interviews 
and released statements refuting Breitbart’s assertions. Among other things, they 
noted that the church that caught fire was not targeted by Muslim extremists, did not 
burn to the ground, and is not Germany’s oldest. There is no mention in the Ruhr 
Nachrichten story, published as a live feed during the rowdy celebrations, of a 1000-
strong mob chanting “Allahu Akbar” in the town center of Dortmund, and in the 
video posted online by Breitbart and Ruhr Nachrichten, it is hard to discern any 
chants of Allahu Akbar.  
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Breitbart’s version of the story was published on January 3, 2017. It appears 
to have been based not as much on the live feed published on Ruhr Nachrichten’s 
website, but from the website of Wochenblick.at,190 which was set up by former 
members of Austria’s far-right Freiheits Partei (FPÖ) and is populated with mis- and 
disinformation. The first sentence of the opening paragraph of the report on the 
Austrian website reads: 
“A mob of more than 1,000 men reportedly shot fireworks at police, Syrians 
shouted the Islamic battle cry ‘Allahu Akbar’ and the fire department had to 
extinguish a fire at a church.” 
The lead of the Breitbart story reads: 
“At New Year’s Eve celebrations in Dortmund a mob of more than 1,000 men 
chanted ‘Allahu Akhbar’, launched fireworks at police, and set fire to a historic 
church.” 
The Ruhr Nachrichten story was updated constantly throughout the evening of 
December 31, 2016. At around midnight, the newspaper wrote on its website: “In 
Leeds Place, the fireworks lasted a good 45 minutes, even though it’s forbidden to 
shoot off fireworks near the church. The Reinhold’s church is next to the square. Fire 
fighters had to access the church roof from Klepping Street after netting covering 
some scaffolding was set on fire by fireworks. The small fire was quickly put out. 
                                                 






The firework that started the fire was probably launched from Klepping Street, where 
many people were also celebrating.  
A group of Syrians sang as they celebrated the ceasefire in Syria.”191 
Wochenblick says in its article that it used the photo gallery put together by 
Ruhr Nachrichten reporter Peter Bandermann and a report on WDR television to 
reach their conclusion that most of the mob of 1,000 men were migrants and that they 
targeted police with fireworks.192  
In the Ruhr Nachrichten live-feed from the new year’s celebrations, which 
Breitbart and Wochenblick cite in their articles, the German news website reported 
that the celebrations were rowdy and sometimes dangerous, but nowhere in its text or 
video reports did Ruhr Nachrichten say that Syrians were shouting “Allahu Akbar” or 
that “migrants” were responsible for shooting fireworks at the church, police or into 
the crowd. In fact, Ruhr Nachrichten cites police spokesman Volker Stall who blamed 
“these dangerous actions on young men, with and without a migration 
background.”193  
“At 11:45 pm, a crowd of at least 1,000, made up mainly of young men, 
gathered in Leeds Place in downtown Dortmund. Fireworks were often handled in a 
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risky manner – rockets held with bare hands as they were shot off, instead of placing 
them on the ground. Several unidentified persons threw bangers at police and shot 
fireworks into the crowd, in which there were families with children. The police 
ordered the crowd not to shoot bangers and fireworks into the crowd but their 
announcements over loudspeakers were ignored. Several men were followed, 
detained and searched.” 194 
Bandermann reacted quickly after the Breitbart and Wochenblick articles were 
published. Going point by point through the Breitbart and Wochenblick reports, 
Bandermann corrected what the two websites had reported and confirmed what he 
had seen. While Bandermann agreed that the groups moving through downtown 
Dortmund on New Year’s Eve were made up mainly of young foreign men, he 
refuted reports in Breitbart and Wochenblick that the “mob” in Leeds Place had 
deliberately shot fireworks at the nearby Reinhold’s church and set it alight.  
“The fact is the fire department spoke of a small fire on some scaffolding 
netting, which was quickly put out,” he said in his refutation, echoing what he had 
reported on New Year’s Eve.195 196 
Responding to reports that young men were shouting “Allahu Akbar” in the 
town center, Bandermann replied, “‘Allahu Akbar’ means ‘God is great.’ In the 
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Muslim religion, this expression is as normal as ‘amen’ is in the church. While it’s 
indeed true that terrorists misuse ‘Allahu Akbar’ before they launch attacks, fake 
news producers are linking a group of people in Leeds Place with the attackers in 
Munich (Olympia shopping center)197 and Würzburg,198 and the killer of a priest in 
France.199 The fact is, there was no indication that there were terrorists celebrating in 
Dortmund.”   
The Dortmund police issued a statement on Jan. 5, 2017, saying that the New 
Year celebrations in the city were “average to peaceful” and that police had to 
intervene far fewer times than the previous year.200 
The editor of Breitbart defended the journalist who wrote the piece and the 
article itself. Raheem Kassam slammed U.S. mainstream media and the Ruhr 
Nachrichten for misreporting the incident in Dortmund and Breitbart’s coverage of it. 
The rebuttal article claims, “Much of the media’s outcry over Breitbart News reports 
emanates from the scale of the fire at St. Reinold’s Church;” that “outlets such as 
Mediaite, TeleSur, Sputnik, HuffPo, Media Matters, Deutsche Welle, The 
Washington Post and others decided to use words like ‘Muslim,’ ‘migrant,’ ‘Islam,’ 
‘Arab,’ and ‘immigration’ in their headlines or reporting on our story … to stoke 
fears and division.” Breitbart accused German police and politicians of colluding with 
                                                 
197 Bandermann had himself fallen prey to repeated disinformation – the Munich Olympia shopping 
center shooter was found to be a far-right sympathizer.  
198 A 17-year-old Afghan asylum seeker in Germany attacked people with a knife and hatchet on a 
commuter train in Würzburg in July 2016. The so-called Islamic State claimed he was one of their 
fighters and an IS flag was found in the youth’s room.  
199 In July 2016, two men burst into a church near Rouen, in northern France, slit the 84-year-old 
priest’s throat and took four parishioners hostage. The attackers said they were linked to IS. 






the media to “mask a true version of events that are inconvenient at best, or 
institutionally damning at worst.” The rebuttal ended with the statement that “we at 
Breitbart News … take the utmost care to present facts.”201 Kassam said he would 
leave it to readers to decide whom to believe on the Dortmund story. Whether they 
will look at other sources is open to question. A study by Benkler et al has found that 
readers of far-right websites such as Breitbart tend to consume news mainly from 
sources at the same end of the political spectrum.202  
It could be that right-wing media outlets such as Breitbart and Wochenblick 
were on alert for a repetition of what happened the previous year in Germany, when 
some 1,200 women reported being sexually assaulted by primarily Arab and North 
African men at New Year’s Eve celebrations in German cities. The bulk of the 2015 
assaults happened in Cologne. Germany has taken in hundreds of thousands of 
migrants and refugees since 2015. Analysts have said Germany’s open-doors policy 
toward migrants led to the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, 
which finished third in elections in September 2017.203  
The events in Dortmund would likely have garnered only local coverage but 
for the attention focused on Ruhr Nachrichten by the Breitbart article. Ruhr 
Nachrichten does not show how many times stories on its website are shared, but 
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according to a story by Agence France-Presse (AFP) published in The Guardian 
newspaper, the Breitbart story about New Year’s Eve in Dortmund was clicked on 
and shared tens of thousands of times.204 Breitbart’s site shows it was shared over 
17,000 times on Facebook alone. But shares of rebuttals far outstrip those figures. 
The AFP story cited above was shared more than 33,000 times after it was published 
in The Guardian. Another AFP story published by Ireland’s The Journal has been 
viewed more than 16,000 times.205  
In March 2017, Breitbart put on indefinite hold its plans to launch German 
and French editions,206 207 which had been announced after Donald Trump’s victory 
in the U.S. in 2016. The aim of the bureaus would have been to capitalize on the anti-
immigrant sentiment sweeping Europe with a view to creating Trump-style upsets in 
2017 elections in the two European countries.208 209 Breitbart’s Rome correspondent 
told Germany’s Junge Freiheit website that the expansion into Europe had been 
delayed indefinitely due to “the many complications involved” in opening new 
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bureaus.210 Among the complications was the fact that “Breitbart  has a poor 
reputation in Germany,” according to the Handelsblatt newspaper.211 “A recent 
Breitbart article about an alleged attack in Dortmund reported false and highly-
exaggerated facts, leading to a tongue-lashing from various German news sources,” 
Handelsblatt reported, referring to the New Year’s Eve story run by Breitbart. 
Note: Bandermann inadvertently showed the staying power of disinformation 
when he linked the shootings at Munich’s Olympia shopping center in July 2016 to 
Islamic extremists. During the Munich shootings, a woman who identified herself as 
Lauretta claimed on Twitter that the shooter had shouted “Allahu Akbar” before 
opening fire. “With her statements, she planted the seed of Islamic terror in people’s 
minds, a thought that many probably already entertained as the shootings were being 
reported,” wrote Nina Probst in the Miesbacher Merkur newspaper. “Lauretta told 
(CNN) by phone, ‘I heard ‘Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar.’ She 
recognized it because she is herself Muslim, she said.  Her 8-year-old son was in the 
restroom with the shooter and saw as he loaded his weapon. Only CNN carried a 
report with this witness. Later, her statement was shown to be false.” An investigation 
in Germany found that the Munich shopping center shooter had been motivated by 
far-right beliefs.   
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How social media, new tech drive the disinformation 
tsunami 
 
Twitter was a year old when Estonia came under disinformation and cyber 
attack from Russia, and two years old when Russia launched similar attacks, along 
with a conventional warfare assault, on Georgia. Both Estonia and Georgia fought 
back against the attacks on the same media as they were occurring, largely the 
internet (but not social media) and conventional media. Today, many disinformation 
attacks occur on social media, and Twitter in particular.  
5.1 Twitter’s role 
 
Launched in March 2006, Twitter had 330 million active users worldwide by 
2018.212 Twitter is one of the largest mediums easily accessible to ordinary citizens, 
i.e. not trained journalists, on which they can receive, create and spread real and fake 
news. Like many other social media, Twitter allows news and other information to be 
posted publicly and immediately, but unlike some social media, particularly 
Facebook, Twitter users can follow another user without that user’s agreement and 
without the other user following them.213 214 This makes more information available 
to them. The use of hashtags on Twitter (# followed by a word or phrase) allows users 
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to categorize tweets by keyword, which helps to make tweets easier to find in a 
Twitter search.  
Twitter has been called “the par excellence social media to catch up on recent 
news and events.”215 The medium has grown into a real-time news source created by 
everyday users.216 Three-quarters of Twitter users got their news on the 
microblogging site in 2017, according to a survey conducted in August 2017 by the 
Pew Research Center.217  
Twitter has on many occasions beaten traditional media with a breaking news 
story. For example, Twitter users announced 15 minutes before the mainstream media 
that a U.S. Airways flight had ditched on the Hudson River in New York in 2010.218  
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The public often turns to Twitter for information during a crisis.219 220 221 222 
Twitter served as a “crucial channel of communication” between the Kenyan 
government, emergency responders and the public during the four-day Westgate Mall 
siege in Nairobi in 2013,223 carried blow-by-blow updates from official and unofficial 
sources during and after the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013,224 and was used as a 
“hub of timely information provision to help people stay informed and safe” when 
Hurricane Sandy hit New York and New Jersey in 2012.225   
Twitter users accept that, in a crisis especially, tweets will often not provide 
sources, which could be used to confirm the accuracy of information being shared.226 
Users have also come to accept that the restricted length of tweets (280 characters, 
formerly 140) means tweets rarely, if ever, include supporting arguments.227 As a 
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result, many users do not become suspicious of unreferenced assertions on Twitter, 
which makes it an excellent vector for disinformation.228  
During rioting in London in August 2011, reports on Twitter said tanks were 
massing in the City of London, the London Eye Ferris wheel on the banks of the 
Thames was on fire, a tiger was roaming the city streets,and rioters had broken into a 
MacDonald’s and started cooking their own food,229 The Guardian newspaper 
reported. Many of the fallacious tweets included pictures, and it was this 
“photographic evidence – even if doctored, or indeed even if of a completely separate 
event – [that] made believers of many tweeters,” The Guardian said.  
All of those tweets were shown to be false. Some false stories were shut down 
by other Twitter users, according to The Guardian story, which was based on data 
compiled for an analysis by The Guardian and the London School of Economics of 
the riots, and included a chapter on Twitter and other social media.230   
People will turn to social media for updates during a crisis if the authorities do 
not post updates and other information about the emergency in a timely and regular 
manner, write Nickolas Jones et al in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences (PNAS).231 Individuals who have to rely on social media for updates are 
exposed to more conflicting information than those who obtain information from 
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traditional media, and often feel “helpless and without situational control,” Jones et al 
say. This can “lead people to see patterns in the information obtained that are not 
present.” Jones et al suggest that officials should monitor social media channels 
during a crisis, and regularly release updates on those same social media during the 
event. This could reduce individuals’ exposure to mis- and disinformation and 
mitigate distress among people trying to follow and make sense of the crisis.232  
Twitter makes spreading disinformation and rumors easy233 -- users simply hit 
“retweet” to pass on a message. During breaking news situations, when new 
information is released piecemeal – including by trusted authorities and journalists – 
and often starts off as unconfirmed information,234 more misinformation and 
disinformation are likely to be shared by users. Zubiaga et al found that unverified 
information that was shared on social media and later was shown to be false took 
seven times longer to leave the news stream (they call this “being resolved”) than 
unverified information that turned out to be true.235  
A study by Kate Starbird et al. of how disinformation spread on Twitter after 
the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings found that retweets of false information 
outnumbered retweets of corrections by 44 to one.236  Starbird et al cited an 
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@NBCNews tweet that said an eight-year-old spectator had been killed in the 
bombings. About 45 minutes later, someone else tweeted that the young victim was a 
girl and a competitor in the race: 
@TylerJWalter (April 15, 2013 7:15pm): An eight year old girl who was 
doing an amazing thing running a marathon, was killed. I can’t stand our world 
anymore 
Four minutes later, another user added a fake picture and purposefully spread 
the false rumor: 
@_Nathansnicely (April 15, 2013 7:21pm): The 8 year old girl that sadly 
died in the Boston bombings while running the marathon. Rest in peace beautiful x 
http://t.co/mMOi6clz21237 
Starbird and her colleagues identified nearly 93,000 tweets that were related to 
the original erroneous tweet from @TylerJWalter. Of those tweets, nearly 91,000 
were disinformation and just 2,046 were corrections.238 An analysis conducted by 
MIT researchers of 126,000 stories tweeted by 3 million users over more than 10 
years found that false news narratives spread “farther, faster, deeper, and more 
broadly”239 than the real thing. 
The study by Starbird et al. also illustrates the unmanageable volume of 
information that can circulate during a crisis. Filtering with the words “Boston,” 
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“bomb,” “explosion,” “marathon,” and “blast,” Starbird and her colleagues collected 
over a one-week period starting the day of the race (April 15, 2013) and ending on 
April 21 some 10.6 million tweets related to the marathon. More than half of those 
tweets were retweets.240  
Blair Thompson, an associate professor of communications at Western 
Kentucky University whose research includes crisis communication at schools, 
looked at the role of social media in active shooter incidents in schools. Interviews 
with crisis team members from 21 school districts in three states found most schools 
don’t have a social media strategy to deploy during crises, and crisis teams said they 
felt unprepared to cope with the challenges presented by social media, particularly 
misinformation and disinformation generated by students and their parents.241  
Although many Twitter users question disinformation when they see it,242 
spreading misleading information during a crisis impedes sense-making and pushes 
some recipients of disinformation to take dangerous or harmful action. For instance, 
the armed man who showed up at a D.C. pizzeria a month after Donald Trump was 
elected president had been misled by disinformation that grew out of a hack of the 
Democratic National Committee’s emails, since blamed on Russia. The shooter 
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believed Hillary Clinton and her campaign manager, John Podesta, were running a 
child sex ring in the basement of the Comet Ping Pong pizzeria.  
“As wait staff went table to table, whispering to customers to get out, [the 
gunman, Edgar Maddison] Welch maneuvered into the restaurant's kitchen. He shot 
open a lock and found cooking supplies. He whipped open another door and found an 
employee bringing in fresh pizza dough. Welch did not find any captive children – 
Comet Ping Pong does not even have a basement – but he did prove, if there were any 
lingering doubts after the election, that fake news has real consequences,” said an 
article published in Rolling Stone.243 
The false story that drove Welch to travel to D.C. to “save” the children being 
held at the pizzeria had been circulating for weeks on social media, but got a boost 
and spread like wildfire when it was posted on Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn’s Twitter feed 
by his son. To my knowledge, there were few rebuttals to the tweet alleging that the 
pizzeria housed a child sex ring.  
The improbability of Pizzagate makes many people ask: How did we get to 
the point where we swallow any piece of information that’s flung at us? Even the 
Pizzagate gunman’s friends, whom he tried to convince to go along on his trip from 
North Carolina to D.C. to liberate the children, reportedly told him it sounded as if 
they would be liberating “some oppressed pizza from the hands of an evil pizza 
joint."244  
                                                 
243 Robb, A. Anatomy of a Fake News Scandal, Rolling Stone Magazine, Nov. 16, 2017. 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/pizzagate-anatomy-of-a-fake-news-scandal-w511904 





Twitter has also been used to amplify disinformation. The Atlantic Council’s 
Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) reported in March 2018 that a Twitter poll 
posted by a U.K. account, asking if British Prime Minister Theresa May’s 
government had provided enough evidence to convince other Twitter users that 
Russia was behind the poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his 
daughter, had been amplified by numerous Russian-language accounts, many of 
which were pro-Kremlin trolls.245 DFRLab “tracks global disinformation campaigns, 
fake news stories, covert military developments, and subversive attempts against 
democracy while teaching the public skills to identify and expose attempts to pollute 
the information space.”246 More than three-quarters of respondents to the Twitter poll 
voted no – in other words, they thought the British government had not produced 
enough evidence to point the finger at Russia for the nerve agent attack. DFRLab 
found that many of the 2,808 retweets of the poll were from Russian-language Twitter 
accounts or accounts that “systematically post pro-Kremlin content.”247 Researchers 
at DFRLab concluded that pro-Kremlin Twitter users had influenced the outcome of 
the poll “to create the appearance of greater hostility towards the UK government 
than UK users themselves showed.”248  
5.2 Algorithms replace gatekeepers 
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The role of the gatekeeper – individuals or organizations who filter 
information to determine if it’s true and decide how widely it should be shared – has 
been transferred in the social media world to anyone who produces a piece of 
information and has an internet connection.249 Anyone who posts, retweets or 
otherwise shares information on their blog, Facebook page or Twitter feed assumes 
the role once held by the likes of Walter Cronkite – once voted the most trusted man 
in America (although he was the only journalist among the choices and the rest were 
politicians) – and professional editors in traditional media. While some users of social 
media check what they publish before they post it, others “repost or retweet 
information without reading it carefully, much less doing any due diligence for 
accuracy,”250 writes Aly Colon, Knight professor for journalism and ethics at 
Washington and Lee University.   
Left-wing political and internet activist Eli Pariser argued in a 2011 TED 
talk251  that traditional gatekeepers have been replaced not by other humans but by 
computer algorithms. These algorithms are designed to show individuals stories that 
are in line with their interests, political leanings and personal beliefs. They push 
consumers into “filter bubbles,” defined by Wikipedia as “the intellectual isolation 
that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the 
information a user would want to see and then gives the user that information.252  
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“So if algorithms are going to curate the world for us, if they're going to 
decide what we get to see and what we don't get to see, then we need to make 
sure that they're not just keyed to relevance. We need to make sure that they also 
show us things that are uncomfortable or challenging or important … other points of 
view,”253 Pariser said in his TED talk. Since he gave the talk, people have even less 
incentive to burst out of their filter bubble to see information that disagrees with their 
world view. In 2018, there were 300 moderately to highly partisan websites on the 
left and 200 on the right,254 255  according to Media Bias/Fact Check, a website 
dedicated to educating the public on media bias and deceptive news practices.256 257  
Having a greater number of partisan media outlets available makes it easier for 
information consumers to read, hear or see only news that agrees with their world 
view. There are, however, plenty of opportunities to read unbiased reports: according 
to Media Bias/Fact Check, over 300 media outlets in the U.S. fall under the “least 
biased” category.258  
Benkler et al259 say that liberal consumers of media are more likely to read 
both traditional media – the New York Times, Washington Post, CNN, etc. – and 
more partisan left-wing media such as the Huffington Post, MSNBC or the Daily 
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Beast, while conservative consumers of media, whom the researchers call Trump 
followers, are “Breitbart-centered” and less connected to conservative mainstream 
media, such as the Wall Street Journal. A study by Benkler et al of more than 1.25 
million stories published online between April 1, 2015 and Election Day 2016 found 
that “a right-wing media network anchored around Breitbart developed as a distinct 
and insulated media system, using social media as a backbone to transmit a hyper-
partisan perspective to the world.” But the researchers disagree with Pariser that this 
is likely to have been caused by algorithms. “If technology were the most important 
driver towards a ‘post-truth’260 world, we would expect to see symmetric patterns on 
the left and the right. Instead, different internal political dynamics in the right and the 
left led to different patterns in the reception and use of the technology by each wing,” 
they write in the Columbia Journalism Review.261 
A small study conducted by The Guardian newspaper showed how reluctant 
people are to leave their filter bubbles. In the run-up to the 2016 elections in the U.S., 
The Guardian asked a group of Americans on the right to read left-wing news sites 
and people on the left to read right-wing ones. Not all of the 10 participants in the 
study saw it through to the end. One participant said after visiting a right-wing 
website, “You might as well have been waterboarding a brother.”262  
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Denver-based lawyer Vanessa Otero has produced a helpful chart that assesses 
publications and media outlets on the basis of ideology – shown on the chart’s X-axis 
– and quality/credibility, depicted on the Y-axis. In addition to the Media Bias/Fact 
Check website, Otero’s Media Bias chart can be used to determine the political 
leanings of different media and how reliable their reporting is.  
Vanessa Otero’s Media Bias Chart 
 
Denver-based lawyer Vanessa Otero plotted different media on a graph 
according to the quality of their reporting and credibility of their sources (x-
axis), and their political leanings (y-axis) to produce the Media Bias Chart. 






Tools to detect disinformation 
 
The proliferation of disinformation has led researchers to develop tools to help 
detect it.263 264 These tools are intended to address the imbalance between the high 
volume of fake news and the number of humans working to debunk it. Some of the 
tools attempt to verify already published articles while others check breaking news or 
tweets, such as those sent out during a crisis via Twitter. Most are still in the beta 
stage of development.  Many of the tools were developed for journalists.  
The following tools developed in the United States focus on detecting 
disinformation, rather than correcting and stopping it.  
6.1. TwitterTrails 
 
 TwitterTrails is a tool that allows members of the media to track the 
trustworthiness of stories shared on Twitter.265 By analyzing the origin and spread of 
a story on Twitter, TwitterTrails provides information that “a critically thinking 
person can use to examine how a Twitter audience reacts to the spreading of the 
story.”266  
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Using the URL of a tweet and keywords, TwitterTrails generates a 
propagation graph of a tweet’s life, showing who broke the story on Twitter and who 
picked it up. It identifies when the story broke, how many times it was retweeted, 
which retweets came from verified accounts, how many followers each tweeter of the 
story has. The Wellesley College creators of TwitterTrails say “these are key 
elements in gauging the visibility of the tweet, as well as the degree of credibility 
other users will assign to the tweet and the amount of trust in the user as a source of 
information.”267 Through visualizations, the tool also shows who was mainly 
responsible for sharing the information.  
TwitterTrails uses an algorithm to evaluate two metrics in stories: how much 
they have been passed around and how much the public doubts the validity of the 
story. Higher skepticism and lower spread mean the story is more likely to be false. 
The other way around means it’s more likely to be true. Like the other tools described 
below, TwitterTrails can help journalists to judge if a story is true or false but can’t 
make them believe – at least not immediately – that they should stop reporting the 
story because it is untrue. In one example used to show how TwitterTrails works – the 
story of a rumored plane crash off the Canary Islands, which turned out to be false – 
the developers note that even after “the 9-1-1 type service @112canarias” announced 
that the crash was a false alarm, “news organizations kept propagating the false news 
for more than an hour.”268 
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TwitterTrails requires only a few minutes to an hour to generate a report, 
depending on how many tweets there are to retrieve. It pulls Tweets for analysis from 
Twitter’s search API, and can only analyze recent tweets, but the developers have 
requested access from Twitter for older events of significance.  
6.2 Hoaxy269 
 
Hoaxy® is open-source software that visualizes the spread of claims and 
related fact checking online. A claim may be a fake news article, hoax, rumor, 
conspiracy theory, satire, or even an accurate report. Hoaxy® allows users to see how 
a claim spreads on Twitter, plots the cumulative number of Twitter shares over time, 
and shows how claims spread from person to person.  
Hoaxy® is fully automated (no human input involved beyond developing the 
software). It does not claim to decide whether a story is true or false but visualizes the 
spread of claims and fact checking.  
The creators of Hoaxy® intend for it to be used to observe how unverified 
stories and the fact-checking of those stories spread on social media. It’s up to users 
to gather evidence about a claim and refute it, if they deem that necessary. 
Developed by researchers at Indiana University, Hoaxy only gathers data from 
public messages sent over Twitter (which would include most tweets sent in a crisis), 
and appears to be intended to track already published stories. When I input USAFA in 
Hoaxy’s search bar, most of the stories returned were from websites with right-wing 






biases. Two others were on conspiracy-pseudoscience sites; one site had an extreme 
liberal bias, publishing fake news or overt propaganda with poor or no sourcing; and 
one published stories ranging from “moderately credible to tin-foil hat conspiracies,” 
provided by individuals without credentials. The list, copied below, of stories 
generated only includes those that were tweeted or retweeted, according to Hoaxy.  
 
Results of a search for “USAFA” on Hoaxy, conducted March 31, 2018. 
6.3. Hearsift and Rumor Gauge270 
 
Researchers at the MIT Media Lab have developed a two-part system 
designed to detect rumors (Hearsift) and verify them (Rumor Gauge).   
Hearsift works by inputting raw tweets about an event and filtering them to 
exclude any tweets that don’t make an assertion – defined by the MIT researchers as 
                                                 





an utterance that commits the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition. The 
filtered tweets are then clustered into groups that make similar assertions about an 
event. Tweets using other forms of speech including recommendations, expressions, 
questions, requests and what the MIT researchers call “miscellaneous” are not 
included in the clusters. 
 
Table of speech acts. MIT Ph.D. dissertation by Soroush Vosoughi. P. 39 
 
Clusters of assertion-containing tweets are called rumors. These are input into 
the Rumor Gauge algorithm, which produces a “veracity curve” for each rumor to 





The aim set by the MIT team was to be able “to predict the veracity of rumors 
about real-world emergencies faster than any other public source.”271  The developers 
admit that automatic detection and verification of rumors in Twitter are very difficult 
tasks, because they require “extracting weak signals from very noisy environments.” 
They say their system is only 75 percent accurate, and that it still requires 
human/manual input of data. But the aim of automated programs like Rumor Gauge is 
not to replace humans but to make the job of sorting disinformation from information 
easier by markedly “reducing the bandwidth” of information that someone trying to 
make sense of a crisis situation in real-time has to sift through to sort what’s true from 
what’s false. 
6.4. Spotting photo fakery 
 
Emma Gonzalez became one of the main public voices of students who 
survived the shootings at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, 
Florida. Not long after the shootings, Gonzalez and several other students took part in 
a photo shoot for Teen Vogue. One of the pictures that came out of the shoot showed 
Gonzalez tearing up a paper shooting target. 
A far-right group Photoshopped the picture to show Gonzalez tearing up the 
U.S. Constitution. In addition to swapping the paper target for the Constitution, the 
Photoshoppers also made Gonzalez paler and put dark circles under her eyes. The 
doctored image was posted on Twitter by user @LeighStewy with the message: “I'm 
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interested to hear what US citizens think of this photo where Emma Gonzalez is 
ripping up The Constitution?”  
 
Doctored photo of Emma Gonzalez posted on Twitter by @LeighStewy. 
 
Many of the 2,000-plus replies to the post pointed out that the picture was a 





where I claimed it was real in the first place?”272 Denial is often used by purveyors of 
disinformation when they are called out for their actions. 
Like text and announcements read out in the Roman forum, photography lost 
its innocence many years ago.273 The first instance of photographic fakery is thought 
to date from around 1860, when Abraham Lincoln’s head was cut and pasted onto the 
body of Southern politician John Calhoun.274 Stalin, Adolf Hitler and present-day 
autocrat Kim Jong-un airbrush or Photoshop people they’ve fallen out with or had 
killed275 from pictures.276   
Today, it has not only become easier to doctor images than it was in the 1860s 
but there are also several tools for detecting doctored photos, or for finding the origin 
of a photo. Photographers and photo editors can often spot a doctored image by 
checking whether the light source on all subjects is from the same direction or by 
using their knowledge of other photos. The Ukrainian website StopFake.org, which 
was set up in 2014, the year Russia annexed Crimea, to verify and refute 
disinformation and propaganda about events in Ukraine being circulated in the media, 
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has put together a list of tools to detect doctored photos.277 Fotoforensics.com uses 
algorithms to help researchers determine if a picture is real or computer graphics, if 
it’s been modified and even how it’s been modified.278 Reverse image searches 
(https://reverse.photos/, https://www.tineye.com/, inter alia) can be used to check for 
the origins of a picture. The picture below, for instance, was used on an anti-DACA 
meme circulating on Twitter in January, saying we should feed hungry American-
born children before looking after children brought to the U.S. illegally by their 
parents. 
 
Photo of boy in Alaska used in anti-DACA meme on Twitter. 
A reverse image search showed that the picture was taken by Natalie Fobes on 
the Yukon River in Alaska. It was licensed by Getty Images for editorial use. Other 
                                                 







pictures in the series taken by Fobes indicate that the child is probably not hungry. 
The original image can be viewed here. 
6.5. Fake videos 
Technological advances allow fake videos to be convincingly real. For 
example, Professor Matthias Niessner’s Visual Computing Group at the Technical 
University Munich279 has developed a program that allows the facial expressions of 
someone in a video to be altered in real-time using a webcam that shoots images of a 
source actor and transfers the actor’s facial movements to the target person, with very 
realistic results. The potential for hacking livestreams and other broadcasts is 
frightening.  
Even without software, videos can be faked. One way to do this is to post a 
video or part of a video out of context. This happened during the USAFA shooter 
alert when a cadet shot a video through the spyhole of his dorm room door, showing 
security forces conducting a sweep of the building. While some posted the video in its 
correct context, other Twitter users said the brief cellphone video showed the alleged 
shooters dressed as security forces.  Those videos have been taken down.  
Completely fabricated videos were used to attack Broward County Sheriff 
Scott Israel after the mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in 
Parkland, Florida, on Feb. 14, 2018. The videos show a young woman saying the 
sheriff had impregnated her when she was 17 and then told her to have an abortion.280 
The videos were first posted in 2012, when Israel successfully ran for sheriff against 
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the Republican incumbent, Al Lamberti. They were left on YouTube over the years, 
in spite of Israel’s request that they be taken down because they were fake and a 
rebuttal video by Israel’s wife. After the mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas 
High School, the videos resurfaced and very rapidly had more than 130,000 views – 
until Politico reporter Marc Caputo found the woman in the videos, who told him 
they were made when she was 17 for $25 each, and were completely fake.281  
Caputo’s investigative work succeeded in pressuring Google, which owns YouTube, 
to take down the videos, although the Politico report says they initially refused.  
Although the original videos are no longer accessible on YouTube, I was able 
to find one of the series posted on an individual’s YouTube page, with opening 
credits that read “Fair Use Act 1976.” Furthermore, several right-wing sites have not 
issued corrections to indicate that the videos are fabrications. This illustrates how 
disinformation can endure online, particularly in the universe of social media, even 
after it’s been conclusively proven to be false.  
It’s also worth noting that these false videos were detected through “manual” 
investigations by a journalist. Caputo found the woman in the videos by “combing 
internet videos and social media.”282  
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I set out to test the hypothesis that refuting rumors and disinformation early in 
a crisis can help to stop disinformation. This was driven by a personal experience – an 
active shooter alert at my son’s school during which updates from the authorities 
were few and far between while disinformation ran riot.  
For this research I looked at several cases, including the disinformation 
campaigns in Estonia, Georgia and Germany. My aim in analyzing disinformation 
events in these countries was to see how quickly officials responded to disinformation 
attacks, and whether their responses were effective in shutting down the attacks. My 
conclusions are that their responses were quick, and they did prevent disinformation 
from achieving its presumed goals, usually to promote the agenda of the suspected or 
known perpetrator. But even rapid intervention and refutation did not stop 
disinformation completely.  
When disinformation targets a country, it seeks to “impact national decision-
making.”283 In Estonia, its aim was to convince the Estonians to reverse a decision to 
relocate a Soviet-era statue of a Red Army soldier to a military cemetery. It wanted to 
convince Georgians to not pursue NATO membership. In Germany, it sought to sow 
anti-immigrant sentiments with an article about New Year’s Eve celebrations in 
Dortmund.  Quick and decisive responses from all three targets helped to stem the 
                                                 






flow of disinformation and shift support away from the purveyors of disinformation 
to the local authorities’ version of events. More research is needed, however, to be 
able to attribute the success of these responses to their timeliness.  
While many institutions have plans in place for physically managing a crisis – 
ordering a lockdown, evacuating a building, etc – few appear to have a strategy for 
dealing with disinformation, usually on social media, during a crisis. Few researchers 
have looked at the disinformation/social media response of organizations, but those 
who have, such as Thompson et al, 284 say school districts are “typically 
underprepared” for mounting a social media response during a crisis situation. 
“Communication elements such as how to monitor and address social media traffic 
are often not considered until after the shooting, resulting in a lack of preparedness. 
Yet, scant research exists which could directly inform the management of these 
events (e.g., managing emotions of those directly involved, identifying impacted 
students, continuing student learning) with both internal (administration, teachers, 
student body) and external (media, parents, law enforcement, cooperation between 
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agencies, hospitals, counseling services, coordination of the command center) 
constituents.”285  
This lack of social media preparedness on the part of organizations occurs in 
spite of the fact that more and more people turn to social media for information 
during a crisis. An analysis by Jones et al of five hours of Twitter data gathered 
during a school shooting found that when there were gaps in official communication 
during the crisis, more rumors were shared via Twitter and negative emotions among 
students rose.286 The advice they have for officials involved in a crisis is to monitor 
social media channels to mitigate the negative impact of rumors during collective 
traumas by posting official updates early and often on the same social media channel 
as the disinformation is circulating.  
This is key to dispelling disinformation. Lewandowsky et al note that once 
disinformation is received by the public, it becomes very difficult to correct or 
retract.287 False information that lingers can have a severe impact on society, they say. 
For example, after unsubstantiated claims of a vaccination-autism link, many parents 
decided not to immunize their children, which led to an increase in preventable 
diseases “and hence preventable hospitalizations, deaths, and the unnecessary 
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expenditure of large amounts of money for follow-up research and public-information 
campaigns aimed at rectifying the situation,” the researchers say.288 
Most of the applications being developed today aim to detect disinformation 
(Chapter 6), but my observations are that few organizations have policies on what 
officials should do once the disinformation alarms have sounded. Few have a rapid 
response strategy that is poised and ready to be deployed when disinformation 
spreads on social media – which is where most disinformation circulates. These 
issues need to be studied in greater detail, and organizations should be helped to 
devise strategies to fight disinformation if it is to be nipped in the bud.   
  









o Agence France-Presse. German police quash Breitbart story of mob setting fire to 




o Allcott, H & Gentzkow, M. Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election. 
National Bureau of Economic Research working paper No. 23089. Jan 2017, revised 
April 2017. http://www.nber.org/papers/w23089   
 
o The Baltic Times. Unsigned. "Estonia - Crossroads of History" expresses Russia's 
position. Dec. 15, 2016. https://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/17039/  
 
o Barker, G. G., & Yoder, M. E.  The Virginia tech shootings: Implications for crisis 




ngs%3A+Implications+for+crisis+communication+in+the+educational+setting&    
 
o Benkler, Y et al. Study: Breitbart-led right-wing media ecosystem altered broader 
media agenda. Columbia Journalism Review. March 3, 2017. Accessed online at 
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php 
 
o Bernstein, J. Making a Crisis Worse, Journal of Promotion Management, 12:3-4, 39-
45, 2006. https://doi.org/10.1300/J057v12n03_04 
 
o Beaumont, C. New York plane crash: Twitter breaks the news, again. The Telegraph 




o Blank, S. Web War I: Is Europe's First Information War a New Kind of War?, 
Comparative Strategy, 27:3, 227-247. July 2008 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01495930802185312 
 








o Bogart LM & Thorburn, S. Are HIV/AIDS Conspiracy Beliefs a Barrier to HIV 
Prevention Among African Americans? Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency 




o Bogart LM, et al. Endorsement of a genocidal HIV conspiracy as a barrier to HIV 
testing in South Africa. Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 




o Bogart LM, Wagner G, Galvan FH, Banks D. Conspiracy Beliefs about HIV Are 
Related to Antiretroviral Treatment Nonadherence among African American Men 
with HIV. Journal of acquired immune deficiency syndromes (1999). 
2010;53(5):648-655. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2845717/ 
 
o Boghart, T. Operation INFEKTION: Soviet Bloc Intelligence and Its AIDS 










o Broersma, T.  & Graham, Twitter as a news source. Journalism Practice, 7:4, 446-
464. May 30, 2013.   https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2013.802481 
 
o Caputo, Marc. ‘Oh my God…It’s fake’: Far right falls for hoax about Broward 








o Chamberlain,  P. Twitter as a vector for disinformation. Journal of Information 





issue-1 (Subscriber access only. Draft version available at http://arkem.org/disinfo-
twitter.pdf) 
 
o Chivvis, C. Understanding Russian hybrid warfare and what can be done about it. 
Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 




o Cohen, A & Hamilton, R. The Russian Military and the Georgian War: Lessons and 
Implications. Strategic Studies Institute. Sept. 1, 2011. p. 44. 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1069.pdf 
 
o Colon, A. You are the keeper of the news. The Conversation. Feb. 7, 2017. 
https://theconversation.com/you-are-the-new-gatekeeper-of-the-news-71862 
 
o Cutler, R. Russia’s disinformation campaign over South Ossetia. CACI Analyst. 
August 20, 2008. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-
articles/item/11678-analytical-articles-caci-analyst-2008-8-20-art-11678.html 
 
o Davis, J. Hackers Take Down the Most Wired Country in Europe. Wired Online. 
Aug. 21, 2007.  https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ff-estonia/ 
 
o Digital Forensic Research Lab. Unsigned. #PutinAtWar: Trolls on Twitter. Battles on 
Twitter over the Skripal poisoning case. March 24, 2018. 
https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-trolls-on-twitter-5d0bb3dc30ae 
 
o Digital TV Europe.  Unsigned. Estonian pubcaster expanding reach of Russian-




o Dorell, O. Breitbart, other’alt-right’ websites are the darlings of the Russian 




o Dougherty, J. The mouse clicks of August: Hybrid warfare, nation-state actors and 








o Englishrussia.com. Unsigned. The Bronze Soldier. 
http://englishrussia.com/2007/04/27/the-bronze-soldier/  
 








o Estonian Public Media website. Unsigned. Bronze Night’s only death still unsolved. 
April 26, 2017. https://news.err.ee/592217/bronze-night-s-only-death-still-unsolved 
 
o Estonian Public Media website. Unsigned. Estonian prosecutors close investigation 
into Dmitri Ganin’s death.. June 15, 2017 https://news.err.ee/602231/estonian-
prosecutors-close-investigation-into-dmitri-ganin-s-death     
 
o EU East StratCom Task Force. Means, goals and consequences of the pro-Kremlin 




o EU vs Disinfo website Unsigned. Nine ways to confuse us about MH17. Sept. 30, 
2016. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/nine-ways-to-confuse-us-about-mh17/  
 
o EU vs Disinfo website. Figure of the week: 20. Posted on Mar. 27, 2018. 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/figure-of-the-week-20/  
 
o EU vs Disinfo website. Unsigned. Disinformation Review. March 15, 2018. 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/skripal-and-the-disinformation-swamp/ 
 
o Evron, G. Estonia 10 Years Later: Lessons learned from the World’s First Internet 




o Evron, G. A Russian strategist’s take on information warfare. Darkreading.com. 







o Fedchenko, Y. Kremlin propaganda: Soviet active measures by other means. 
Sojateadlane (Estonian Journal of Military Studies), Volume 2, 2016, pp. 141-170. 
PDF accessed online at www.ksk.edu.ee/publikatsioonid 
 
o Farid, H. Digital doctoring: how to tell the real from the fake. Royal Statistical 
Society. Nov. 2006. https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1740-
9713.2006.00197.x 
 
o Flitter, E. Exclusive: Riding Trump wave, Breitbart News plans U.S., European 
expansion. Reuters. Nov. 9, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
trump-strategy-idUSKBN1342TP 
 




o Geissler, E., & Sprinkle, R. Disinformation squared: Was the HIV-from-Fort-Detrick 
myth a Stasi success? Politics and the Life Sciences, 32(2), 2-99. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/43287281 
 
o Grassegger, H & Krogerus, M. Fake news and botnets: How Russia weaponized the 




o Graves, BE. The smoking gun of AIDS: A 1971 flowchart. Dec. 6, 2000. 
https://www.bibliotecapleyades.net/sociopolitica/esp_sociopol_depopu40.htm 
 
o Green European Journal. Unsigned. Green Observatory: Fake News. Undated. 
https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/green-observatory-fake-news/#Hungary 
 
o Gross, J. Chemical weapons watchdog backs up U.K. view on spy poisoning. The 
Wall Street Journal. April 12, 2018. https://www.wsj.com/articles/novichok-was-
used-in-skripal-attack-chemical-weapons-watchdog-confirms-1523532806 
 
o The Guardian/London School of Economics.  Reading the riots. Investigating 
England’s summer of disorder. 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46297/1/Reading%20the%20riots(published).pdf pp. 30-33. 
 
o Hahn, G. The 2008 Georgian-Ossetian/Russian war: Saakashvili’s strategic 








o Hale, V. Revealed: 1,000-Man Mob Attack Police, Set Germany’s Oldest Church 








o Harkins, S. G., & Petty, R. E. (1987). Information utility and the multiple source 
effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(2), 260-268. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.52.2.260 
 
o Hasher, L., Goldstein, D., & Toppino, T. (1977). Frequency and the conference of 
referential validity. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 16, 107- 112. 
 
o Heshmat, S. What is confirmation bias? Psychology Today.  April 23, 2015. 
Accessed online at https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/science-
choice/201504/what-is-confirmation-bias 
 
o Hollis, D. Cyberwar case study: Georgia 2008. Small Wars Journal. 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/639-hollis.pdf  
 
o Iasiello, EJ. Russia’s improved information operations: From Georgia to Crimea. The 
U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Parameters 47. No. 2. p51. Summer 2017. 
http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3368.pdf  
 
o Interfax news agency, March 28, 2015. 
http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=581851I 
 
o International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS). Unsigned. Russia’s 




o Internet Research Agency Indictment. 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download 
 
o Ioffe, J. The history of Russian involvement in America’s race wars. The Atlantic. 







o Johnson, JR. The authenticity and validity of Antony’s will. L'Antiquité Classique. T. 
47, Fasc. 2 (1978), pp. 494-503. https://www.persee.fr/doc/antiq_0770-
2817_1978_num_47_2_1908 
 
o Jones, N et al. Rumors during a campus lockdown. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences Oct 2017. 114 (44) 11663-11668. 
http://www.pnas.org/content/114/44/11663 
 
o Joubert, V. Five years after Estonia’s cyber attacks: lessons learnt for NATO? NATO 
Research Paper. No. 76. May 2012. 
 
o Thejournal.ie.Unsigned. Breitbart ran a fake story about a terrorist outrage in 
Dortmund, and Germans aren’t one bit happy. 2016. http://jrnl.ie/3173688 
 
o Junge Freiheit website. Unsigned. Keine deutschsprachige Breitbart-Ausgabe (No 
German language Breitbart). March 3, 2017. 
https://jungefreiheit.de/kultur/medien/2017/keine-deutschsprachige-breitbart-ausgabe/  
 
o Kaminska, I. A lesson in fake news from the info-wars of ancient Rome. Financial 
Times. Jan 17, 2017. https://www.ft.com/content/aaf2bb08-dca2-11e6-86ac-
f253db7791c6 
 
o Kietzmann, JH et al. Social media? Get serious! Understanding the functional 
building blocks of social media. Business Horizons (2011) 54, 241—251. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bushor.2011.01.005 
 








o Kivirahk, J. Integrating Estonia’s Russian-Speaking Population: Findings of National 




o Kumar, KPK &  & Geethakumari, Detecting misinformation in online social 







o Kwak, H. et al. What is Twitter, a social network or a news media? Proc. of the 
18th international conference on World Wide Web. Pp 591-600. April 2009. 
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1772751 
 
o Laruelle, M. (ed). Russian Nationalism, Foreign Policy and Identity Debates in 
Putin's Russia.  Ibidem Press, Stuttgart. 2014. pp. 133-134 
 
o Lazer et al. Combating fake news: an agenda for research and action. Harvard 
Kennedy School, Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy. 
Conference report from Feb. 17-18, 2017. Accessed online at 
https://shorensteincenter.org/combating-fake-news-agenda-for-research/ 
 




o Lewandowsky, S. et al. Misinformation and Its Correction: Continued Influence and 
Successful Debiasing. Psychological Science in the Public Interest 13(3) 106–131. 
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1529100612451018 
 
o Lucas, E & Pomeranzev, P. Winning the information war. Center for European Policy 
Analysis report. p.23. August 2016. https://cepa.ecms.pl/files/?id_plik=2706 
 
o Marwick, A & Lewis, R. Media manipulation and disinformation online. Data & 




o Mazer, J. et al. Communication in the face of a school crisis: Examining the volume 
and content of social media mentions during active shooter incidents. Computers in 








o Mendoza, M. et al. Twitter Under Crisis: Can We Trust What We RT? In Proc. of 1st 







o Metaxas et al. Do Retweets indicate interest, trust, agreement? 
arXiv:1411.3555v1 [cs.SI] 
 
o Metaxas, PT. Retweets indicate Agreement, Endorsement, Trust: A Meta-Analysis of 
Published Twitter Research. Computer Science Department, Wellesley College. 
Accessed online at http://cs.wellesley.edu/~pmetaxas/WorkingPapers/Retweet-
meaning.pdf 
 
o Metaxas, P.T., Finn, S., & Mustafaraj, E. (2015) DEMO: Using TwitterTrails.com to 




o Miller, C. The big business of disinformation. Wired.com. June 17, 2017. 
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/carl-miller-disinformation-gets-commercialised  
 
o Mohdin, A. What’s “alt-right” in German? Breitbart News is expanding in Europe. 
Quartz. Nov. 20, 2016. https://qz.com/841959/breitbart-news-is-coming-to-france-
and-germany-ahead-of-elections/  
 
o Narayanan, V. et al. Polarization, Partisanship and Junk News Consumption over 
Social Media in the US. Computational Propaganda Project, University of Oxford. 
Feb. 6, 2018. http://comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/sites/93/2018/02/Polarization-Partisanship-JunkNews.pdf 
 
o Nazario, J. Politically motivated denial of service attacks. NATO Cooperative Cyber 




o Nguyen T.N., Li C., Niederée C. (2017) On Early-Stage Debunking Rumors on 
Twitter: Leveraging the Wisdom of Weak Learners. In: Ciampaglia G., Mashhadi A., 
Yasseri T. (eds) Social Informatics. SocInfo 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science. Vol 10540. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-67256-4_13 
 
o Nordrhein-Westfalen Dortmund Polizei, Jan. 5, 2017. 
https://www.presseportal.de/blaulicht/pm/4971/3527791  
 
o Pääbo, H. War of Memories: Explaining “Memorials War” in Estonia. Baltic Security 
& Defence Review Volume 10, 2008.   
 
o Pal, A. Reviewing the Landscape of Research on the Threats to the Quality of User-





Technology. 53:1. 2016. 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/pra2.2016.14505301077 
 
o Panagiotopoulos, P. et al. Social media in emergency management: Twitter as a tool 
for communicating risks to the public. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.06.010  
 
o Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews, The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" 
Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It. Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html. 
 
o PunditFact web pages on May 14, 2018 for Breitbart, Fox News, Daily Caller, 








o Richards, J. Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. 
National Security. International Affairs Review. http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65 
 
o Richards, J & Lewis, P. How Twitter was used to spread – and knock down – 
rumours during the riots. The Guardian. Dec. 7, 2011. 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/dec/07/how-twitter-spread-rumours-riots 
 




o Roeder, T. No evidence of shots fired at Air Force Academy; social media fuels 
'hysteria.' Colorado Springs Gazette. Oct. 1, 2017. http://gazette.com/no-evidence-
of-shots-fired-at-air-force-academy-social-media-fuels-hysteria/article/1612291 
 
o Ruhr Nachrichten. https://www.Ruhr Nachrichten.de/Nachrichten/Polizei-reagiert-
auf-Fake-News-zu-Dortmunder-Silvester-60951.html  
 
o Ruhr Nachrichten. https://www.Ruhr 
Nachrichten.de/Staedte/Dortmund/Silvesterrakete-trifft-Obdachlosen-64703.html 
 
o Ruhr Nachrichten. Bandermann, P. Fragen und Antworten: Wie die Medien die 









o Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman’s comment on investigation into 
the death of Ganin. Sept. 2016. http://www.mid.ru/en_GB/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2435063 
 




o Shachtman, N. Top Georgian Official: Moscow Cyber Attacked Us – We Just Can’t 
Prove It. Wired Magazine. March 11, 2009. Cited in Hollis, D. Cyberwar case study: 
Georgia 2001. Small Wars Journal. Available in full at 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/03/georgia-blames/ 
 
o Shearer, E & Gottfried, J. News use across social media platforms 2017. Pew 
Research Center. Sept. 7, 2017. http://www.journalism.org/2017/09/07/news-use-
across-social-media-platforms-2017/# 
 
o Silverman, C et al. Hyperpartisan Facebook pages are publishing false and misleading 




o Simon, T. et al. Twitter in the Cross Fire—The Use of Social Media in the Westgate 
Mall Terror Attack in Kenya. PLoS ONE 9.8 (2014). 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0104136 
 
o Sirianni, F. Was Mark Antony’s will partially forged? L'Antiquité Classique. T. 53 
(1984), pp. 236-241. https://www.persee.fr/doc/antiq_0770-
2817_1984_num_53_1_2126 
 




o Starbird et al. Chatter on the red: what hazards threat reveals about the social 
life of microblogged information. Proceedings of the 2010 ACM conference on 






o Starbird, K. et al. Rumors, False Flags, and Digital Vigilantes: Misinformation on 







o Stein, A. We Thought It Could Never Happen Here, Journal of  Promotion 
Management, 12:3-4.Pp. 99-128, https://doi.org/10.1300/J057v12n03_07 
 
o Stone, Daniel F. and Wood, Daniel H., Cognitive Dissonance, Motivated Reasoning, 
and Confirmation Bias: Applications in Industrial Organization (December 2, 
2016). http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2834072 
 












o Traynor, I. Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estonia. Russia accused 
of unleashing cyberwar to disable Estoniahe Guardian. May 16, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia 
 
o Thompson, B. et al.  (2016) Social Media and Active Shooter Events: A School Crisis 
Communication Challenge, Qualitative Research Reports in Communication, 18:1, 8-
17. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17459435.2016.1247111  
 
o United States Department of State, Soviet Influence Activities: A report on Active 














o U.S. Information Agency report Soviet Active Measures in the 'Post-Cold War' Era 
1988-1991, prepared for U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Appropriations. June 1992. Accessed online at 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/sect_09a.htm. Full report at 
http://intellit.muskingum.edu/russia_folder/pcw_era/index.htm#Contents 
 
o Vieweg, Sarah. Microblogged Contributions to the Emergency Arena: Discovery, 




o Vosoughi, S. Automatic Detection and Verification of Rumors on Twitter. Ph.D. 
dissertation.MIT.  June 2015. p 19. 
http://lsm.media.mit.edu/papers/Soroush_Vosoughi_PHD_thesis.pdf 
 
o Vosoughi, S et al. The spread of true and false news online. Science. Mar 9,2018. 
Vol. 359, Issue 6380, pp. 1146-1151. 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/359/6380/1146 
 
o Vosoughi, S et al. Rumor Gauge: Predicting the veracity of rumors on Twitter. ACM 
Transactions on Knowledge Discovery from Data, Vol. 11, No. 4, Article 50, July 
2017.  
 
o Wasson, DL. Second Triumvirate. Accessed online at Ancient History Encyclopedia. 
https://www.ancient.eu/Second_Triumvirate 
 
o Weir, K. Why we believe alternative facts. American Psychological Association. May 
2017, Vol 48, No. 5. http://www.apa.org/monitor/2017/05/alternative-facts.aspx 
 
o Westerman, D. et al. Social Media as Information Source: Recency of Updates and 
Credibility of Information. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 19 (2014) 
171–183. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcc4.12041  
 
o Wikileaks Cable 297, par. 5. 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07TALLINN310_a.html 
 







o Wilby, P. Georgia has won the PR war. The Guardian. Aug. 17, 2008 
https://www.theguardian.com/media/2008/aug/18/pressandpublishing.georgia  
 
o Wilson, Clay. 2007. Information operations, electronic warfare, and cyberwar 
capabilities and related policy issues. [Washington, D.C.]: Congressional Research 
Service, Library of Congress. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf  
 
o Wochenblick’s Dortmund New Year’s Eve 2016/17 story accessed online. 
https://www.wochenblick.at/silvester-in-dortmund-allahu-akbar-und-kirchenbrand/ 
 
o Wong, JC et al. Bursting the Facebook bubble: We asked voters on the left and right 
to swap feeds. The Guardian. Nov. 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/16/facebook-bias-bubble-us-election-conservative-liberal-news-feed 
 
o Yakowicz, W. Have a beer, it’s good for your brain. Inc.com. Oct. 3, 2014. 
https://www.inc.com/will-yakowicz/beer-improves-brain-function.html 
 
o Zamzow, DR et al. Xanthohumol improved cognitive flexibility in young mice. 
Behavioural Brain Research. Volume 275, 15 December 2014, Pages 1-10. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bbr.2014.08.045 
 
o Zubiaga, A. et al. Analysing how people orient to and spread rumours in social media 
by looking at conversational threads. PLoS ONE. 11. 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0150989 
 
o Zubiaga, A. et al. Curating and contextualizing twitter stories to assist with social 
newsgathering. Proceedings of IUI 2013, pp 213–224. March 19–22, 2013. 
https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2449424 
 
 
 
